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THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE
PORTION CAP RULE: LAWFULLY REGULATING PUBLIC
ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
KARA MARCELLO

Faced with an obesity epidemic, on September 13, 2012, the New
York City Board of Health became the first local administrative body to
amend its health code to restrict the size of sugar-sweetened beverages
sold in the food service establishments subject to its jurisdiction. A
legal challenge led by the American Beverage Association quickly
followed.
In March 2013, the New York County Supreme Court struck down
the portion cap rule. The challengers succeeded by arguing that the
Board’s promulgation of the portion cap rule violated the separation of
powers doctrine under the state constitution by usurping the power
endowed to the New York City Council. In addition, the court held that
the portion cap rule was arbitrary and capricious. The Appellate
Division affirmed the decision in July 2013. In October 2013, the New
York Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case.
This Note defends the legality of the portion cap rule as a valid
exercise of the Board of Health’s police power. This Note elucidates
the power of the Board, which is ultimately derived from the state,
through an examination of municipal home rule, the city charter,
commentary illustrating the intent of the state legislature, and case law.
The decisions of the courts striking down the portion cap rule represent
a fundamental misunderstanding of the quasi-legislative powers of the
Board of Health to address the evolving public health needs of the
people of New York City.
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THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE
PORTION CAP RULE: LAWFULLY REGULATING PUBLIC
ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
KARA MARCELLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 2012, New York City became the first local
government to amend its health code to cap the portions of sugarsweetened beverages1 sold at food service establishments.2 The New York
City Board of Health passed the portion cap rule in response to the
connection between consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages and the
obesity3 epidemic plaguing the city.4 Public health laws, like the portion
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Boston University, B.A. magna
cum laude 2010. I would like to thank Professor Lindsay Wiley and Professor Loftus Becker for their
thoughtful feedback. I also wish to thank my twin Kate Marcello for her medical guidance and support.
In addition, I would like to thank my friend Mike Samsel for calling my attention to the portion cap
rule. Last but not least, I would like to thank my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their
extraordinary assistance.
1
“Sugar-sweetened beverages,” or “SSBs,” are synonymous with sugary beverages when used in
this Note. They are commonly defined as “beverages that contain added, naturally derived caloric
sweeteners such as sucrose (table sugar), high-fructose corn syrup, or fruit-juice concentrates, all of
which have similar metabolic effects.” Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic
Benefits of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599 (2009).
2
Bd. of Health, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§ 81.53) to Article 81 of the New York City
Health
Code,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
MENTAL
HYGIENE
1
[hereinafter Notice of Adoption], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/2012
/notice-adoption-amend-article81.pdf.
3
“For adults, overweight and obesity ranges are determined by using weight and height to
calculate . . . the ‘body mass index’ (BMI).”
Defining Overweight and Obesity, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/defining.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2012). For a majority of people,
BMI “correlates with [the individual’s] amount of body fat.” Id. “An adult who has a BMI between 25
and 29.9 is considered overweight,” while “[a]n adult who has a BMI of 30 or higher is considered
obese.” Id.
4
“Epidemic” is conventionally used to refer to a nationwide problem and is defined as “affecting
or tending to affect a disproportionately large number of individuals within a population, community,
or
region
at
the
same
time.”
Epidemic,
M-W.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/epidemic (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
In contrast, a “pandemic” is
conventionally used to refer to a global problem and is defined as “occurring over a wide geographic
area and affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population.” Pandemic, M-W.COM,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pandemic (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); see also Barry M.
Popkin et al., Global Nutrition Transition and the Pandemic of Obesity in Developing Countries, 70
NUTRITION REVS. 3, 4 (2012) (estimating that, in 2008, 1.5 billion adults worldwide were considered
overweight or obese). For purposes of this Note, “epidemic” is used due to the Note’s focus on the
obesity problem in the United States and New York City in particular.
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cap rule, are the foundation of “legal preparedness for obesity prevention
and control, because they . . . specify rights and responsibilities of private
parties.”5 A growing body of research demonstrates the role such laws can
play in decreasing the incidence of obesity.6
Obesity is a national problem. More than one-third of American
adults, or 35.7%, are obese.7 The United States Surgeon General has
labeled obesity prevention a “community responsibility.”8 A national goal
set in 2000 to reduce the incidence of obesity in ten years has fallen far
“out of reach.”9 The problem is projected to continue and proliferate, and a
recent survey estimates that by 2015, “41% of American adults will be
obese, and 24% of children and adolescents will be overweight or obese.”10
If the law does not intervene, American children may live less healthy,
shorter lives than the previous generation.11
The obesity epidemic “is unlikely to yield to any single policy
intervention, so it is important to pursue multiple opportunities to obtain
incremental gains.”12 The portion cap rule reflects the hallmark of public
health regulation as a “partial and incremental” response to the health
threat posed by obesity.13 Targeting obesity by regulating the consumption
of sugar-sweetened beverages is not a new innovation.14 Excise taxes on
sugar-sweetened beverages have received growing consideration among

5
Judith A. Monroe et al., Legal Preparedness for Obesity Prevention and Control: A Framework
for Action, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 16 (2009).
6
Id. It is the law that “shapes the situational and environmental influences that drive both dietary
intake and physical activity,” while groups of stakeholders, including the government and the food
industry, attempt to use the law to alter those influences. Jess Alderman et al., Application of Law to
the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90, 90 (2007).
7
Adult Obesity Facts, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Aug. 16,
2013).
8
Alderman et al., supra note 6, at 90.
9
Lainie Rutkow et al., Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling
Laws and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 772 (2008).
10
Id. (citing Youfa Wang & May A. Beydoun, The Obesity Epidemic in the United States—
Gender, Age, Socioeconomic, Racial/Ethnic, and Geographic Characteristics: A Systematic Review
and Meta-Regression Analysis, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 6, 22 (2007)).
11
Michael Cardin et al., Preventing Obesity and Chronic Disease: Education vs. Regulation vs.
Litigation, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 120, 120 (2007).
12
Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1603.
13
Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Local Bds. of Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents-Appellants at 12, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). “Given the multi-factorial
nature of threats to the public’s health, an incremental approach is not only legal, but often necessary.”
Id. at 9.
14
The portion cap rule is not the first regulation aimed at decreasing SSB consumption in New
York City. See Anne Barnhill & Katherine F. King, Evaluating Equity Critiques in Food Policy: The
Case of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 301, 301 (2013) (noting the “recent,
unsuccessful effort by New York State to exclude sweetened beverages from the items eligible for
purchase in New York City with [the] Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program”).
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15

policymakers, public health advocates, and the media.
In 2008, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggested a federal excise tax on
sugar-sweetened beverages to fund health care reform, which the CBO
estimated would generate $50 billion in revenue between 2009 and 2018.16
Although President Barack Obama entertained the idea of an excise tax on
sugary beverages as a part of health care reform, the plan was “smothered”
by Americans Against Food Taxes17 and other soft drink industry
lobbyists.18
Some health and policy advocates are specifically calling for local
governments to take action to quell the obesity crisis.19 The New York
City Board of Health answered the call by enacting the portion cap rule.
Subsequently, the deep pockets of the American Beverage Association
(ABA)20 were quick to challenge the legality of the rule by filing a petition
to block and invalidate it with the New York County Supreme Court.21 On
March 11, 2013, one day before the regulation was set to take effect, Judge
Milton Tingling granted the ABA’s order to enjoin and permanently
restrain the City from implementing or enforcing the portion cap rule.22
The City appealed the next day.23 On July 30, 2013, the Appellate

15
Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Estimating the Potential of Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages to
Reduce Consumption and Generate Revenue, 52 PREVENTIVE MED. 413, 413 (2011).
16
Id. at 413–14.
17
Membership includes “the soft drink makers, their suppliers, and such mass-marketers as
McDonald’s and Domino’s Pizza.” Tom Hamburger & Kim Geiger, Soda Tax Fizzles: Targeting
Lawmakers and Nutritionists, Beverage Firms Put a Stopper in the Plan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at
A1.
18
Id. Although “public health advocates thought the tax would be a natural for congressional
Democrats looking for revenue to fund expanded health insurance coverage,” the plan was not
embraced by some White House staff, and “[a] key congressional committee, after initially seeming
receptive, ended up refusing to consider it.” Id.
19
See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY, at S-1 (Lynn Parker et al. eds., 2009),
available at http://www.nccor.org/downloads/downloads/Local%20Gov%27t%20Actions%20to%20Pr
event%20Childhood%20Obesity.pdf (“Local government leadership is critical to both reducing and
preventing further increases in childhood obesity. The places in which people live, work, study, and
play have a strong influence on their ability to consume healthy foods and beverages and engage in
regular physical activity.
Local governments make decisions every day that affect these
environments.”).
20
The ABA “is the trade association that represents America’s non-alcoholic beverage industry.”
History, AM. BEVERAGE ASS’N, http://www.ameribev.org/about-aba/history/# (last visited Nov. 3,
2013). According to the ABA website, “[t]he non-alcoholic beverage industry . . . . has a direct
economic impact of $141.22 billion.” Id.
21
See infra Part III.C.
22
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
23
Notice of Appeal by Respondents at 1, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12,
2013).
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Division affirmed Judge Tingling’s ruling. A few days later, the City
appealed the decision to the New York Court of Appeals.25 On October
17, 2013, the New York Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case.26
This Note will defend the New York City portion cap rule by arguing
that the regulation is a legal exercise of the New York City Board of
Health’s power and can ultimately withstand legal challenges by the
fervent opposition. Part II will stress the state of the nation’s obesity
epidemic and the increased research on the connection between sugarsweetened beverage consumption and obesity and chronic illnesses. Part
III will provide an overview of the history of the New York City Board of
Health and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Then, Part III will
introduce the portion cap rule and detail the legal challenge currently being
litigated. Part IV will discuss the powers of the Board of Health by first
providing an overview of municipal home rule and then analyzing the
modern version of the New York City Charter and applicable case law.
Part IV will also detail other recent Board of Health regulations aimed at
curbing obesity. Part V will support Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s
assertion that “the judge is one-hundred percent wrong,”27 by illustrating
that Judge Tingling’s and the Appellate Division’s rulings represent a
fundamental misunderstanding of the powers of the Board of Health, as
well as a misapplication of the Boreali framework and the standard of
judicial review governing Board of Health rulemaking. Part VI will
address potential arguments concerning the Board of Health’s authority
under the United States Constitution, specifically the Commerce Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause.
II. SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE CONSUMPTION
AND THE NATION’S OBESITY EPIDEMIC
The latest edition of the national dietary guidelines reveals that, across
the country, “the prevalence of obesity has doubled and in some cases
tripled between the 1970s and 2008.”28 New York is among the many
24
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
25
NYC to State Top Court: Review Big-Soda Ban Ruling, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/56693345-79/court-board-drinks-health.html.csp.
26
Daniel Wiessner, New York Court to Hear Bloomberg’s Appeal to Restore Soda Ban, REUTERS
(Oct.
17,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/us-nycsodaban-appealidUSBRE99G0T620131017. At the time of this Note’s publication, the date of the argument has not
been set; the Appellant Reply Brief is not due until February 28, 2014. Court of Appeals Court Docket,
COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF N.Y., https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/courtpass/Docket.aspx (search
by APL Number 2013-00291) (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
27
Morning Joe (MSNBC television broadcast Mar. 13, 2013) (interview of N.Y.C. Mayor
Bloomberg by Mika Brzezinski).
28
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR
AMERICANS 9 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter DIETARY GUIDELINES], available at
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states facing the challenges of obesity, as 2011 data from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) shows that approximately 24.5% of
adult residents in New York are obese.29 According to one report, if it
follows current trajectories, New York State’s obesity rate could reach
50.9% by 2030.30 Strikingly, within the confines of New York City, 58%
of adult residents are currently considered overweight or obese.31 Various
medical studies emphasize that this obesity epidemic has a close
relationship with sugary beverages—a common part of the American diet.
A.

Medical Studies Link Sugar-Sweetened Beverages to Obesity and
Related Health Problems

The health problems most often associated with obesity include type 2
diabetes,32 heart disease,33 and certain types of cancer,34 leading to the
conclusion that “obesity can increase the risk of premature death.”35
Despite the fact that “[d]ietary recommendations to prevent chronic
diseases have always been controversial,”36 the correlation between sugary
beverage consumption and obesity is gaining increased recognition,37 and
“[t]he science base linking the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages
to the risk of chronic diseases is clear.”38
http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/DietaryGuidelines/2010/PolicyDoc/PolicyDoc.pdf.
29
Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 7.
30
Adult Obesity Rate in New York Could Reach 50.9 Percent by 2030, According to New Study,
TR. FOR AM.’S HEALTH, http://tfah.org/reports/obesity2012/?stateid=NY (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
31
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
32
Type 2 diabetes is a chronic illness characterized by high levels of sugar in the blood; an
individual with type 2 diabetes is insulin resistant, with the fat, liver, and muscle cells responding
incorrectly
to
insulin.
Health
Guide:
Type
2
Diabetes,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/type-2-diabetes/overview.html (last updated June 28,
2011). When blood sugar is not stored for energy, it causes sugar to build up in the blood; this
condition is called hyperglycemia. Id.
33
“The well-documented adverse physiological and metabolic consequences of a high intake of
refined carbohydrates such as sugar include the elevation of triglyceride levels and of blood pressure
and the lowering of high-density lipoprotein cholesterol levels, which would be expected to increase
the risk of coronary heart disease.” Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1601.
34
DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 20.
35
Id. at 9.
36
Joanne Slavin, Beverages and Body Weight: Challenges in the Evidence-Based Review Process
of the Carbohydrate Subcommittee from the 2010 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, 70
NUTRITION REVS. 111, 112 (2012).
37
See Jason M. Fletcher et al., Are Soft Drink Taxes an Effective Mechanism for Reducing
Obesity?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 655, 656 (2011) (“The rise in obesity has coincided with the
rise in soft drink consumption.”); see also id. at 656–57 (asserting that “there are few compelling
studies that can explicitly make a causal claim for a connection between soda consumption and
obesity,” but nonetheless concluding that “the many potential links with a wide array of poor health
outcomes suggest that there could be potential improvements in the health of the population from
public policies that are effectively able to reduce soda consumption”).
38
Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1604.
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A recently released study that spanned multiple decades and involved
more than 33,000 Americans “has yielded the first clear proof that drinking
sugary beverages interacts with genes that affect weight, amplifying a
person’s risk of obesity beyond what it would be from heredity alone.”39
The expansive genetic study arrived at the following conclusion:
[T]he combined genetic effects on BMI and obesity risk
among persons consuming one or more servings of sugarsweetened beverages per day were approximately twice as
large as those among persons consuming less than one
serving per month. These data suggest that persons with
greater consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may be
more susceptible to genetic effects on adiposity. Viewed
differently, persons with a greater genetic predisposition to
obesity appeared to be more susceptible to the deleterious
effects of sugar-sweetened beverages on BMI. Our findings
further underscore the need to test interventions that reduce
the intake of sugary drinks as a means of reducing the risk of
obesity and related diseases.40
In addition, researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health
conducted a meta-analysis study that pooled data from eleven other studies
and demonstrated that sugary beverage consumption “is associated with a
clear and consistently greater risk of metabolic syndrome and type 2
diabetes.”41 One portion of the study included 19,431 participants and
5,803 cases of metabolic syndrome.42 Participants in the highest category
of sugary beverage intake, drinking one to two beverages per day, were
39
Marilynn Marchione, Soda, Other Sugary Drinks More Firmly Tied to Obesity in New Studies,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/21/obesity-soda-sugarydrinks_n_1904732.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
For a full discussion of the study’s
methodology, see Qibin Qi et al., Sugar Sweetened Beverages and Genetic Risk of Obesity, 367 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1387, 1388–89 (2012).
40
Qi et al., supra note 39, at 1393. The strengths of the study “include the prospective design, the
large sample, use of repeated measures of sugar-sweetened beverage intake and BMI, comprehensive
coverage of the established BMI-associated genetic factors, and replication of the results across three
cohorts.” Id. at 1395.
41
Press Release, Harvard Sch. Pub. Health, Sodas and Other Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Linked
to Increased Risk of Type 2 Diabetes, Metabolic Syndrome (Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/sugar-sweetened-beverages-sodas-diabetesmetabolic-syndrome/. The study has been hailed as “the first meta-analysis to quantitatively review the
evidence linking sugar-sweetened beverages with type 2 diabetes and metabolic syndrome.” Id.
Metabolic Syndrome “is the name for a group of risk factors that raises your risk for heart disease and
other health problems, such as diabetes and stroke.” What Is Metabolic Syndrome?, NAT’L HEART,
LUNG, & BLOOD INST., http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/ms/ (last updated Nov. 03,
2011). If an individual has at least three of the five following risk factors, they are considered to have
metabolic syndrome: abdominal obesity, a high triglyceride level, a low HDL cholesterol level, high
blood pressure, or a high fasting blood sugar. Id.
42
Press Release, Harvard Sch. Pub. Health, supra note 41.
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found to have a 20% greater risk of developing the syndrome than those in
the lowest category of intake.43 Another portion of the study that followed
310,819 participants and 15,043 cases of type 2 diabetes revealed that
participants in the highest category of sugary beverage intake had a 26%
greater risk of developing type 2 diabetes than participants in the lowest
category of intake.44 The researchers determined that the risk of
developing metabolic syndrome and type 2 diabetes through the
consumption of sugary beverages results not only from the corresponding
increase in weight, but also from “the high levels of rapidly absorbable
carbohydrates in the form of added sugars, which are used to flavor these
beverages.”45 Consequently, scholars and prominent organizations, such as
the American Heart Association, are calling for dramatic reductions in
consumption of sugary beverages.46
B. The Pervasiveness of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages in the American Diet
Sugary beverages are “ubiquitous” and “sugar-and-calorie laden.”47
Defined in the Dietary Guidelines as “soda, energy drinks, and sports
drinks,” sugar-sweetened beverages comprise 36% of added sugar intake
and rank as the highest source of added sugar in the American diet.48
Relatedly, “soft drinks represent the largest category of energy intake
among adults in the U.S.”49 Further, there is evidence that people do not
limit caloric consumption from other foods after consuming sugary
beverages.50 Fructose, an ingredient found in sugary beverages, may affect
physiological processes and result in a feeling of starvation, effectively
provoking more food consumption.51 These sugary beverages “are not
necessary for survival, and an alternative (i.e., water) is available at little or
no cost.”52 Thus, in the context of the obesity epidemic, soft drinks have
43
Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Risk of Metabolic Syndrome and Type
2 Diabetes, 33 DIABETES CARE 2477, 2481 (2010).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 2482.
46
Id. at 2477.
47
Drink Water, Coffee, and Tea Instead of Sugary Beverages, 35 ENVTL. NUTRITION 3, 3 (2012).
48
DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 28. But see Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2–3
(relying on a 2000 article published in the Journal of the American Dietetic Association to assert that
sugary drinks, as “the largest source of added sugar in the average American’s diet, compris[e] nearly
43% of added sugar intake”). In addition, “sugar-sweetened fruit drinks,” defined as “fruit-flavored
drinks, fruit juice drinks, and fruit punch,” comprise ten percent of calories from added sugar intake.
DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 28 & n.54.
49
Fletcher et al., supra note 37, at 656.
50
Id.
51
See id. (“[F]ructose may act to block the leptin signal pathway (where leptin is a protein
hormone that plays a key role in regulating energy expenditure, appetite, and metabolism), resulting in
a sense of starvation and driving further food intake.”).
52
Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1603.
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53

been labeled public enemy number one.
It is worthwhile to note that sugar-sweetened beverages have a
significant impact on the health of America’s youth. Soda is devoid of
non-caloric nutrients and may, in the long run, contribute to malnutrition,
especially in children.54 According to the CDC, sugary beverage
consumption has risen one hundred percent among young adults since the
1970s.55 These young Americans receive excess amounts of the dailyrecommended amounts of sugar from sugary beverages, which in turn
This
contributes to the increasing rates of childhood obesity.56
undoubtedly motivated health advocates and organizations to sign on to a
letter to the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
which argued for the addition of health notices on sugary beverages to help
implement the national dietary guidelines.57
There is a definite connection between sugar-sweetened beverage
consumption and obesity. Sugar-sweetened beverages ultimately lead to
weight gain due to their “high added sugar content, low satiety potential
and incomplete compensatory reduction in energy intake at subsequent
meals after consumption of liquid calories, leading to positive energy
balance.”58 Although it is only one component of American dietary intake,
sugar-sweetened beverage consumption deserves to be the subject of
government regulation, given the research demonstrating its connection to
the obesity epidemic and its ubiquity in the American diet.
III. THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF HEALTH: FROM REGULATING TO
CONTAIN A YELLOW FEVER OUTBREAK TO THE PORTION CAP RULE
For over two hundred years, the New York City Board of Health has
53
Cardin et al., supra note 11, at 122. The recommendation to decrease intake of sugary
beverages has been championed by the Institute of Medicine, the American Heart Association, the
Obesity Society, and many other organizations. Sonia Caprio, Calories from Soft Drinks—Do They
Matter?, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1463 (2012); see also Affidavit of Commissioner Thomas A.
Farley at 4, N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2012) [hereinafter
Affidavit of Commissioner Farley] (asserting that “research recently published in the New England
Journal of Medicine on September 21, 2012 provided further confirmation that sugary drinks are
associated with obesity”).
54
Fletcher et al., supra note 37, at 656.
55
Drink Water, Coffee, and Tea Instead of Sugary Beverages, supra note 47, at 3.
56
Should the Federal Government Regulate Sugary Drinks?, HEALTH CARE EXPERTS BLOG
(Nov. 1, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://healthcare.nationaljournal.com/2011/11/should-the-federalgovernment.php.
57
Organizations that signed the letter included the New York Department of Health, American
Public Health Association, the California Center for Public Health Advocacy, the Boston Public Health
Commission, the Philadelphia Department of Public Health, and the El Paso, Texas, Department of
Health. Health Warnings Urged for Soda & Other Sugary Drinks, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB. INT. (Jan. 3,
2011), http://www.cspinet.org/new/201101031.html.
58
Malik et al., supra note 43, at 2482.
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responded to a number of infectious disease outbreaks. More recently, the
regulations promulgated by the Board of Health have responded to the
incidence of chronic disease. The promulgation of the portion cap rule
evidences this latter trend.
A. History of the New York City Department of Health and the Board of
Health
The New York City Board of Health, considered the predecessor to the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,59 was first established in 1805
pursuant to an ordinance of the New York City Common Council.60
Responding to the outbreak of yellow fever, the Common Council
determined that the City needed more control over sanitation in order to
curb the epidemic.61 In February 1866, the state legislature passed a public
health law creating the Metropolitan Board of Health.62 Of the nine board
members, three had to be physicians appointed by the governor, which
took control of health matters out of the sole hands of politicians and gave
some of it to health professionals.63 The law rendered the Metropolitan
Board of Health the most powerful local public health body in the country,
as it proceeded to respond to a cholera epidemic.64 In 1870, while New
York City operated under the corrupt hold of Tammany Hall,65 a new city
charter was adopted to revert control over health matters back to the City.66
The charter formed a New York City Department of Health, which was
overseen by a Board of Health.67 Instead of appointment by the governor,
59
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK
CITY: 200 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP 1 (2005) [hereinafter PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS],
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/bicentennial/historical-booklet.pdf.
60
Id. at 4.
61
Id. During “the next half-century, the Board generally took a reactive stance, meeting
whenever an epidemic threatened the city.” Id.
62
Id. at 12.
63
Id.; see New York City Board of Health, History: From Typhus to Trans Fat,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/about/boh.shtml (last updated Mar. 5, 2013) (“Everything changed
in 1866, when the New York State Legislature expanded the Board and insulated it from political
influence by setting aside seats for physicians and scientists.”). The impetus for this change was the
Tammany machine. See PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS, supra note 59, at 12 (“In the late
1850s, reformers began calling for the state legislature to establish an independent city health
department that would not be controlled by the corrupt Tammany machine. The first public health bill
proposing such a department was introduced in 1859.”).
64
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS, supra note 59, at 15.
65
See Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PAPERS PROJECT,
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/tammany-hall.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013)
(“Tammany Hall was the name given to the Democratic political machine that dominated New York
City politics from the mayoral victory of Fernando Wood in 1854 through the election of Fiorello
LaGuardia in 1934.”).
66
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS, supra note 59, at 15–16.
67
Id. at 16.
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68

members were appointed by the mayor. Despite the fact that the Board
of Health and the Health Department were headed by appointees of
Tammany Hall, “the physicians and other experts in these divisions created
a buttress against political influence.”69 At the beginning of the twentieth
century, the Health Department labored to address a tuberculosis epidemic
and high childhood mortality rates,70 followed by the polio and influenza
epidemics.71 By the mid-twentieth century, infectious diseases were
largely controlled,72 while “[c]hronic disease, including diabetes, heart
disease, high blood pressure, and cancer, became the next frontier for
public health.”73 Since the 1950s, the Health Department has responded to
a variety of public health concerns including the AIDS epidemic of the
1980s,74 a resurgence of tuberculosis,75 the West Nile virus,76 and the
public health effects of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.77
Following voter approval, the Department of Health merged with the
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Alcoholism
Services in 2002, becoming the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
as it is known today.78 That same year, Thomas R. Frieden became the
Commissioner of the Department.79 Commissioner Frieden initiated health
surveys “to monitor the health of each community and increased the
Department’s focus on programs that address chronic disease and health
inequities.”80 Thomas Farley was appointed New York City Health
Commissioner in May 2009,81 and has continued Frieden’s commitment to
fighting chronic disease.
1. The Composition of the Board of Health
The current New York City Board of Health in the City’s Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene comprises one chairperson who serves as
68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. at 20, 23. In 1900, the Board of Health passed an ordinance requiring mandatory reporting
by physicians of all tuberculosis cases, which was the leading cause of death in New York City. Id. at
20.
71
Id. at 26.
72
Id. at 46.
73
Id. at 49. This new development in public health led the City Health Department in 1958 to
establish a Health Research Council with a budget of $7 million to study chronic and infectious
diseases. Id.
74
Id. at 52.
75
Id. at 60.
76
Id. at 64.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 63–64.
79
Id. at 67.
80
Id.
81
Biography of Thomas Farley, M.D., M.P.H., NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/abo
ut/commish-bio.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
69
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the New York City Health Commissioner and ten members who are
appointed by the mayor to serve for a term of six years without
compensation.82 Five of the members must be doctors of medicine, with at
least ten years’ experience in one of the following areas: clinical medicine,
neurology, psychiatry, public health administration, or college level public
health teaching.83 The other five members are not mandated to be doctors,
but must meet certain education and experience requirements.84
B. The Portion Cap Rule and the New York City Board of Health’s
Reasoning
On September 13, 2012, the New York City Board of Health voted85 to
enact Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s proposal to limit the size of sugarsweetened beverages sold in food service establishments86 to sixteen
ounces or less.87 The portion cap rule amends article 81 of the New York
City Health Code—which concerns regulations applicable to food
preparation and food establishments as found in title 24 of the Rules of the
City—by adding section 81.53.88 To fall within the purview of the portion
82

N.Y.C. CHARTER § 553.
Id.
84
Id. These five members must hold at least a master’s degree in environmental, biological,
veterinary, physical, or behavior health or science, or a related field, and must have at least ten years’
experience in that field. Id. The current Board consists of seven physicians, one Doctor of Public
Health (Dr.P.H.), one Ph.D., and one M.P.H. New York City Board of Health, Meet the Current
Members, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/about/boh.shtml (last updated Mar. 5, 2013).
Of the seven physicians, three also have an M.P.H.; one of those three members is also a Dr.P.H. Id.
85
The amendment and regulation passed with an affirmative vote by eight board members; one
member abstained, one member was not present for the vote, and one member had recently retired.
Michael M. Grynbaum, Health Panel Approves Restriction on Sale of Large Sugary Drinks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, at A24.
86
The proposal defined food service establishments as those that are regulated by the Department
of Health. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 1. Article 81 of the Health Code:
83

[A]pplies to all food service establishments and non-retail processing establishments
where food, as defined in Article 71 of this Code, is prepared and offered for
service, including but not limited to: mobile food vending units, mobile food
vending commissaries, other food commissaries and shared or communal kitchens
that are not inspected or regulated according to the State Agriculture and Markets
Law, vending machines, temporary food service establishments, caterers, cafeterias,
charitable organizations’ kitchens, social clubs, delicatessens, restaurants, and, bars.
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.01 (2013).
87
The vote to limit the size of sugar-sweetened beverages to sixteen ounces took place after a
public hearing and a subsequent six-week public comment period, during which over 38,000 public
comments were received, with 32,000 supporting the regulation. Affidavit of Commissioner Farley,
supra note 53, at 4, 21. After the public comment period, “[n]o changes [were] made to the
amendment in response to comments the Department received. The language . . . [was] modified to
clarify that the limitation extends to any cup or container used for a sugary drink or provided for a selfservice drink.” Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 3.
88
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2–3.
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cap rule, the sugar-sweetened beverage must be: (1) sweetened with sugar
or another caloric sweetener by more than twenty-five calories per eight
fluid ounces of beverage; (2) no more than fifty percent milk89 or milk
substitute by volume; and (3) non-alcoholic.90 Carbonated and noncarbonated beverages alike may be subject to the regulation,91 but one
hundred percent fruit juices are exempt.92 Food service establishments and
self-serve establishments cannot sell, offer, or provide a beverage meeting
the definition of a sugar-sweetened beverage in a cup or container greater
than sixteen ounces.93 Thus, cups or containers of sixteen fluid ounces or
less are allowed.94 Under the rule, a fine of no more than $200 will be
imposed per violation on those who do not follow the regulation;95
however, fines were not set to go into effect until March 2013.96
Included in the notice of adoption are the reasons for the Board of
Health’s actions. The phenomenon of individuals consuming their meals
outside of the home means that they are increasingly exposed to oversized
89
Although the Health Department realized that the milk exception will leave beverages that are
calorie dense or contain added sugar outside the reach of the regulation, the “exclusion for drinks
containing a majority of dairy (by volume) balances the nutritional benefits for consumers.” Affidavit
of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20. The Health Department elaborated:

[T]he nutritional profile of these beverages differs dramatically from that of sugary
drinks. Sugary drinks generally contain no nutrients other than sugar, while milk
and milk products contain calcium, vitamin D and potassium—3 of the 4 “nutrients
of concern” often found deficient in the diets of Americans, according to the USDA.
In addition, dairy products play an important role in a balanced, healthy diet, may
have a protective effect against certain diseases and weight gain, and research shows
they have a greater effect on satiety than sugary drinks.
Id.
90
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5. “Alcoholic beverages are not subject to the Portion Cap
Rule because service of these products is regulated by the State Liquor Authority.” Affidavit of
Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20.
91
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5.
92
Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20 (“Pure fruit juice is exempted as it has
no added sugar and provides many of the same nutritional benefits as the fruit or vegetable from which
it is derived. Sugary drinks, in contrast, contain almost no nutrients other than sugar.”).
93
This includes self-service cups. Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5. The portion cap is set at
sixteen ounces because “[s]ixteen ounces balances health impact and feasibility for restaurants,
indicating that complying with this regulation is possible and not overly burdensome. Manufacturersealed products such as cans are easily available to purchase. Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra
note 53, at 20.
94
The media headlines on September 13, 2012, calling New York City’s action a “soda ban” are
attributable more to the media’s use of hyperbole and flare for dramatization than to the facts of the
regulation. See, e.g., Michael Howard Saul, NYC Board of Health Passes “Soda Ban,” WALL ST. J.
METROPOLIS BLOG (Sept. 13, 2012, 11:12 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/09/13/nycboard-of-health-passes-soda-ban/ (announcing in the headline a “soda ban” but conceding in the article
that the law only implements a ban on the sale of large sugary drinks).
95
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5–6.
96
See id. at 1, 3 (noting the amendment was adopted September 13, 2012, and would take effect
six months from that date).
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97

sugar-sweetened beverages. According to a community health survey98
conducted by the Department of Health in 2010, fifty-eight percent of New
York City adults are overweight or obese, while more than twenty percent
of public school children in the city are obese.99 Diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, and increased mortality are a few of the devastating health
consequences of obesity100—which is taking the lives of six thousand New
Yorkers every year.101 In the city, “chronic conditions [such as type 2
diabetes, heart disease, and obesity] now cause a higher toll of preventable
human suffering than even the most prevalent communicable diseases.
Their burden also uses more of society’s resources.”102
The Board also emphasized the connection between sugar-sweetened
beverage consumption and the obesity epidemic:
Americans consume 200–300 more calories daily than 30
years ago, with the largest single increase due to sugary
drinks. Sugary drinks are also the largest source of added
sugar in the average American’s diet, comprising nearly 43%
of added sugar intake. A 20 ounce sugary drink can contain
the equivalent of 16 packets of sugar. These drinks are
associated with long-term weight gain among both adults and
youth.103
97
98

Id. at 1.
The survey’s methodology is described as the following:
The New York City Community Health Survey (CHS) is a telephone survey
conducted annually by the DOHMH, Division of Epidemiology, Bureau of
Epidemiology Services. CHS provides robust data on the health of New Yorkers,
including neighborhood, borough and citywide estimates on a broad range of
chronic diseases and behavioral risk factors. . . . The survey results are analyzed and
disseminated in order to influence health program decisions, to increase the
understanding of the relationship between health behavior and health status, and to
support health policy positions.

Survey Data on the Health of New Yorkers, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/data/survey.
shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
99
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
100
See Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 3 (“Obesity is a risk factor for many
debilitating and often fatal chronic diseases and health conditions, including heart disease, cancer,
stroke, osteoarthritis, hypertension, gall bladder disease and type 2 diabetes. Adults who are obese are
almost twice as likely to develop diabetes as those who are overweight and almost three times as likely
to develop it as those who are at a healthy weight.”).
101
Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs, Health
Commissioner Farley and Brice Ratner Announce Barclays Center Will Voluntarily Adopt Regulations
to
Limit
Size
of
Sugary
Beverages
(Sept.
13,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?page
ID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom
%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr326-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
102
Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 4–5.
103
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
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Alarmingly, a 2010 community health survey showed that 30% of New
York adults drink one or more sugary beverage per day.104 And the figure
is “much higher in minority and low-income communities.”105 The rate of
consumption among the city’s youth is also very concerning. In 2009,
26% of public school students consumed two or more sugar-sweetened
beverages per day, with 44% of children aged six to twelve years old
consuming more than one per day.106 The Board of Health noted its
particular concern with the portion sizes available to consumers and the
effect such portions have on consumption:
The trend toward larger portion sizes has occurred in parallel
with increases in the prevalence of obesity and people being
overweight.
Serving sizes of manufacturer-packaged
carbonated soft drinks have exploded—the original CocaCola bottle size was 6.5 fluid ounces, which is significantly
smaller than the vast majority of sizes for sale today.
Fountain drink portions at restaurants are also growing—
beverage portion sizes at McDonald’s have increased 457%
since 1955, from 7 fluid ounces to 32 fluid ounces. Some
restaurants in New York City offer individual drink sizes up
to 64 fluid ounces. A sugary drink of this size contains 780
calories and 54 teaspoons of sugar, and no nutrients. Larger
portions lead to increased consumption and calorie intake.
When people are given larger portions they unknowingly
consume more and do not experience an increased sense of
satiety.107
The incidence of obesity in the City in combination with the
trend toward larger drink portions and increased consumption serve
as the foundation for the Board’s reasoning behind adoption of the
portion cap rule.
C. The American Beverage Association’s Legal Challenge to the Portion
Cap Rule
The American Beverage Association (ABA) filed a verified petition
with the New York County Supreme Court on October 11, 2012, seeking to
enjoin and permanently restrain the Department of Health and the Board of

104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
105
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108

Health from enforcing the regulation, and to invalidate it.
In the
alternative, the ABA sought to declare the provisions of the New York
City Charter granting the Board of Health its rulemaking and regulatory
powers unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine
under the state constitution,109 or else to declare the regulation unlawfully
arbitrary and capricious.110
On March 11, 2013, Judge Tingling granted the order to enjoin and
permanently restrain the City from implementing or enforcing the
regulation.111 The ABA succeeded in arguing that, by promulgating the
regulation and circumventing the City Council, the Board “exceeded [its]
authority and impermissibly trespassed on legislative jurisdiction.”112 The
ABA specifically pointed to the four-factor analysis set out in Boreali v.
Axelrod113 as the standard for determining when a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine under the state constitution has been
committed.114 Judge Tingling found that three of the four factors supported
granting the ABA’s motion, concluding the regulation was illegally
promulgated in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.115 In
addition, Judge Tingling assessed the reasonableness of the regulation and
whether it was arbitrary and capricious.116 Although acknowledging the
regulation’s reasonableness, he concluded that the “loopholes in [the] Rule
effectively defeat [its] stated purpose,” and therefore concluded that the
regulation was “fraught with arbitrary and capricious consequences.”117
108
Notice of Verified Petition at 1–2, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2012).
109
Id. at 2. The separation of powers doctrine is “implied by the separate grants of power to each
of the coordinate branches of government.” Clark v. Cuomo, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1985); see
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the senate and
assembly.”); see also Jennifer Weiss, Soda Ban Challenge Has Its Day in Court, WALL ST. J.
METROPOLIS BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2013/01/23/soda-banchallenge-has-its-day-in-court/ (asserting that under the separation of powers argument, “lawyers for
business groups said the Bloomberg Administration didn’t have the authority to push the regulations
through without City Council approval”).
110
Notice of Verified Petition, supra note 108, at 2.
111
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20.
112
Id. at *6.
113
517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355–56 (N.Y. 1987).
114
Notice of Verified Petition, supra note 108, at 29–31.
115
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8–18, *20.
116
Id. at *20.
117
Id. at *34. Judge Tingling found it to be arbitrary and capricious:

[B]ecause it applies to some but not all food establishments in the City, it excludes
other beverages that have significantly higher concentrations of sugar sweeteners
and/or calories on suspect grounds, and the loopholes inherent in the Rule, including
but not limited to no limitations on re-fills, defeat and/or serve to gut the purpose of
the Rule.
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The City appealed the decision the next day.
The Appellate
Division affirmed Judge Tingling’s ruling, finding that “all four Boreali
factors indicat[ed] . . . the usurpation of legitimate legislative functions.”119
Therefore, the court held that the Board of Health violated the separation
of powers doctrine.120 The Appellate Division did not find it necessary to
address whether the portion cap rule was also arbitrary and capricious.121
IV. THE POWER OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH
TO AMEND THE HEALTH CODE
A. An Overview of Municipal Home Rule
The power of local governments has evolved over time. In 1907, the
Supreme Court, declared in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh122 that
“[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State as may be entrusted to them.”123 Thus, the “State . . . at its pleasure,
may modify or withdraw all such [municipal] powers[,] . . . repeal the
charter and destroy the corporation.”124 In a similar vein, Iowa Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Dillon, in what has been branded “Dillon’s
Rule,”125 declared that:
[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily implied or
necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those absolutely essential to the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but
indispensable.126
Id.
118

Notice of Appeal by Respondents, supra note 23.
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
120
Id. at 16.
121
Id.
122
207 U.S. 161 (1907).
123
Id. at 178. The Court upheld the constitutionality of an act of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly authorizing the consolidation of Pittsburgh and Allegheny. Id. at 174, 181. A majority of
the voters living in the two cities collectively voted for the consolidation, but the majority of voters in
the smaller city of Allegheny voted against it. Id. at 174–75.
124
Id. at 178–79.
125
See Richard Shattuck, A Cry for Reform in Construing Washington Municipal Corporation
Statutes—Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 59 WASH. L. REV. 653, 655
(1984) (acknowledging that the Washington Supreme Court had “adopted the narrow, nineteenthcentury approach to municipal corporation powers summarized by ‘Dillon’s Rule’”).
126
Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868); see also GERALD E. FRUG ET AL.,
119
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Under either formulation, it is clear that municipalities have no inherent
power.
Since Hunter and Dillon’s declarations, states have granted
municipalities certain powers through legislation or state constitutional
amendments to reform the legal relationship between states and
municipalities, most notably through the home rule movement.127 Home
rule is a concept of municipal autonomy and self-government under which
“the state grants . . . powers to the citizens of a local area to structure,
organize, and empower their own local government.”128 Although home
rule in relation to Dillon’s Rule has been described as “a competing model
of municipal governance,”129 it may in any given jurisdiction be as limiting
as Dillon’s Rule.130
In New York, municipal home rule is a long-standing constitutional
principle.131 The home rule movement in New York State manifested as a
concerted effort to provide municipalities with autonomy over local affairs
and freedom from state legislative interference.132 Initially, and as a result
of the Constitutional Convention of 1894, a provision was added to the
state constitution granting cities the power to veto special legislative
enactments that related to their property, affairs, or government.133 The
Home Rule Amendment of 1924, i.e., article XII of the state constitution,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 139 (5th ed. 2010) (presenting an excerpt from John Dillon’s
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations section 237).
127
See FRUG ET AL., supra note 126, at 158 (asserting that the home rule movement was the most
important political effort aimed at restructuring the legal relationship between states and cities).
128
Louis V. Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Autonomy: Should the Legislature or the
Courts Modify Dillon’s Rule, a Common Law Restraint on Municipal Power?, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 194,
201 (2007).
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834, 838, 840 (Md. 1988) (holding that a
Montgomery county ordinance that created a private cause of action against abusive employment
practices encroached on an area that was a statewide problem and went above the Maryland
constitution’s grant to municipalities to have the full power to enact local laws).
131
See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. 1989) (declaring that
“[m]unicipal home rule in this State has been a matter of constitutional principle for nearly a century”).
Despite that fact, “[h]ow constitutional home rule can be reconciled with the Hunter principle is an
enduring puzzle in American local government law. . . . [O]bservers struggle to make sense of this
seeming contradiction between the idea of local governments as supplicants and the idea of these
governments as governance partners.” Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home
Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2009).
132
Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1966).
133
11 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2–3 (1938) [hereinafter PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE]. That
provision of article XII became known as the “suspensory veto,” and divided the cities of the state into
three classes depending on size. Joseph L. Weiner, Municipal Home Rule in New York, 37 COLUM. L.
REV. 557, 560 (1937). Any act of the state legislature relating to the property, affairs, or government of
cities and which did not affect all of the cities in one of the classes had to be submitted to the mayors of
the cities affected for their acceptance or rejection; “[t]he consequence of rejection was merely that a
second passage by the State Legislature was necessary to make the law effective.” Id.
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replaced the 1894 provision and added a “far more extensive definition of
the power of cities to rule themselves, retaining only the phrase property,
affairs or government.”134 The scope of a city’s power over its “property,
affairs or government” was subjected to limited and vague judicial
interpretation.135
Under the “emergency clause” of the Home Rule Amendment of 1924,
the state legislature was allowed “on receipt of an emergency message
from the Governor to pass, by two-thirds majority vote, laws relating to the
‘property, affairs, or government’ of cities, which are special in terms or
effect.”136 An “emergency” did not necessitate invocation of the
emergency clause.137 The courts have long acknowledged home rule as
empowering the localities of the state.138 Although the New York Court of
Appeals acknowledged under the home rule provision of the constitution
that the state legislature was no longer the only lawmaking body, the court
also asserted that “[t]here is no constitutional provision that the legislative
body for passing ordinances or laws of a city shall rest in an assembly or a
board of alderman or any other body.”139
In 1964, the New York State Legislature’s “home rule package” went
into effect, which included provisions of article IX of the state constitution
and such statutes as the Municipal Home Rule Law and the Statute of
Local Governments.140 The Municipal Home Rule Law served to
implement article IX of the constitution.141 Home rule in New York
consists of dual assertions of local government power through “limitations
on State intrusion into matters of local concern and affirmative grants of
power to local governments.”142 Under the New York Constitution article
IX, local governments retain the powers granted in the Statute of Local
Governments and the general laws of the state, as well as provision of the

134

PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE, supra note 133, at 3.
Id. at 5.
136
Id.
137
See id. at 6 (acknowledging that “[m]ost of the emergency laws [dealt] largely with charter
amendments of often trifling concern” and other non-emergencies).
138
In 1936, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that “the Home Rule provision of the
Constitution . . . has restricted the legislative powers of the Senate and the Assembly, and has vested
power in cities.” Mooney v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. 1936).
139
Id.
140
Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. 1989).
141
DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 189 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that the law
“specifically gives a municipality, such as the City of New York, the power to enact local laws for the
protection and enhancement of its physical and visual environment and for the government, protection,
order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
142
Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 348; see also James D. Cole, Local Authority to Supersede State
Statutes, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1991, at 34, 34 (“Under Article IX of the State Constitution, home rule in
New York has two basic components.”).
135
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143

state constitution.
In addition, local governments “have power to adopt
and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this
constitution or any general law”144 that relates to “[t]he government,
protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or
property therein.”145 This power under the constitution reiterates the power
under the Municipal Home Rule Law, and is the authority from which
local governments derive their police power.146 The acknowledged
purpose of article IX is to promote strong local government.147 Under the
Statute of Local Governments, municipalities have “[t]he power to adopt,
amend and repeal ordinances, resolutions, and rules and regulations in the
exercise of its functions, powers and duties.”148
Consistent with the past constitutional home rule amendment, the state
legislature may enact either general laws,149 which concern the property,
affairs or government of localities, or special laws, which can be passed
only if one of two stated conditions exist.150 The Municipal Home Rule
Law empowers localities to adopt a new or revised city charter and
provides the ways in which a charter commission may be appointed.151
Ultimately, the charter must be submitted to the city’s electorate for a vote

143

N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c).
Id.
145
Id. § 2(c)(10).
146
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) (McKinney 2012); see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
STATE,
JAMES
A.
COON
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
TECHNICAL
SERIES:
ADOPTING LOCAL LAWS IN NEW YORK STATE 7–8 (reprint 2012), available at
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Adopting_Local_Laws_in_New_York_State.pdf (“The police
power has been defined generally as the power to regulate persons and property for the purpose of
securing the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, peace and prosperity of the municipality . . . .”).
147
See Town of Black Brook v. State, 362 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that to give
effect to such a purpose, a municipality has standing to challenge an Act of the state legislature when
the legislation is challenged as a violation of the home rule guarantees of article IX of the state
constitution).
148
N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(1) (McKinney 2012).
149
A general law is defined in the home rule context as “[a] state statute which in terms and in
effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities,
all towns or all villages.” Cole, supra note 142, at 34 n.6.
150
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) (Lexis current through 2013). This provision effectively means
the “emergency” upheld in Mooney, which triggered the adoption of the modern New York City
Charter in 1923, would not be permissible for New York City today. See Eliot J. Kirshnitz, Recent
Development, City of New York v. State of New York: The New York State Court of Appeals, in
Declaring the Repeal of the Commuter Tax Unconstitutional, Strikes Another Blow Against
Constitutional Home Rule in New York, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 935, 943 n.41 (2000) (describing how
article IX of the New York Constitution provides that, “for cities besides New York City, the state may
act in emergencies certified by the Governor and concurred in by two-thirds of the legislature”).
151
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36; see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 146, at 27
(“All cities in the State are governed by city charters which set forth the basic organization and
administration of government for the city. Cities are authorized to enact new or revised city charters
and to amend existing charters.”).
144
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152

and approved by a majority to become effective.
The home rule provisions under the New York Constitution grant local
government broad police powers in enacting laws and regulations “relating
to the welfare of its citizens.”153 However, two powerful restrictions are
placed on the police power of localities. First, the local government cannot
adopt a law that is inconsistent with the general laws or constitution of the
state.154 Second, the local government cannot exercise its police power
within in an area of regulation that has been preempted by the state
legislature.155
B. The History and Provisions of the New York City Home Rule Charter
Empowering the Board of Health
1. Historical Context of the Adoption of the Modern City Charter
“The purpose of a home rule charter is to render the city as nearly
independent as possible from state interference.”156 A city charter is
properly characterized as the “organic law of the city’s being.”157
Although an older charter had been in place and the Board of Health had
acted pursuant to it,158 voters of the city adopted the revised New York
City Home Rule Charter, which provides the modern structure of the Board
of Health, at the general election of 1937.159 In 1934, acting under the
emergency clause of the Home Rule Amendment of 1924, the Governor of
New York initiated the state legislature’s passage of the New York City
Charter Revision Commission Act (the “Revision Act”).160 The Revision
Act provided for the appointment of a commission by the mayor to prepare
152

N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36 (5)(b), (d).
N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 487
U.S. 1, 1 (1988).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Home Rule City Has Power to Enact Impact Fee Ordinance, MCQUILLIN MUN. L. REP., May
2005, at 6, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157
N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, PROPOSED CHARTER FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION 6 (1936) [hereinafter N.Y.C.
CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT].
158
See People v. Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. 1942) (“The Sanitary Code was formulated by
the Board of Health of the city pursuant to authority conferred by the city charter.”); see also N.Y.C.
CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 157, at 4 (“The Greater New York [City] Charter
was enacted in 1897 and revised in 1901. It was not itself a complete compilation of the law affecting
the city. No such compilation has been made since the Consolidation Act was adopted in 1882.”
(citations omitted)).
159
The Charter became effective January 1, 1938. In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 92 N.E.2d
49, 51 (N.Y. 1950); N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., NEW YORK CITY
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 5 (1938) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION COMM. REPORT].
160
Murray Seasongood, The New York City Charter, 51 HARV. L. REV. 948, 948 (1938) (book
review).
153
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a new city charter, which would become effective upon approval by the
electorate.161 As one commentator observed, “The new charter of the City
of New York differs from ordinary home rule charters . . . [since] it was
necessary to have the State Legislature initiate the charter-making
machinery, because the municipal assembly was unwilling to do so.”162
The revised charter was proposed only after public participation.163 In
its 1936 report, the City Revision Commission noted its concern with the
disordered organization of the laws governing the City.164 For instance, the
provisions of the old charter included authority not given to the City within
the home rule power; many of these offending provisions were removed to
create “a short-form charter, as contemplated by the [state] Legislature,
setting forth the structure of the city government and the manner in which
it is to operate.”165 The Commission thought it wise “to limit the contents
of the charter itself, so far as practicable, to matters subject to local action
under the home rule power.”166
Another concern of the City Charter Revision Commission was the
manner in which it was formed under the state legislature’s Revision Act—
whose creation was prompted by a declaration of an emergency by the
governor.167 The Commission noted that this practice constituted a flagrant
violation of “the home rule principle.”168 Specifically, the Commission
161

Id. at 948–49.
Weiner, supra note 133, at 572.
163
See N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 157, at 2 (“At the outset of its
work the Commission afforded to the people of the city an opportunity to express their views on charter
revision in writing and at public hearings publicly advertised and held during February, 1935, and
thereafter commenced its investigation and consideration of the existing structure of the government of
the city and its administrative processes.”). The Commission also met frequently with experts qualified
to discuss the problems of government and administration. Id. In April 1936, the Commission released
the draft of the proposed charter and preliminary report. Id. Subsequent hearings were held on the
proposed charter in all five boroughs to give the public ample opportunity to participate. Id. at 3.
164
See id. at 5 (“In the period of more than half a century which has elapsed . . . the laws relating
to the City of New York have grown haphazard in an overwhelming mass of statutes without any
system or arrangement. In this disorderly growth conflicts and inconsistencies have multiplied . . . so
that it is a matter of the greatest difficulty today to ascertain the law on any particular question affecting
the government of the city. Neither the Charter of 1897 nor the revision of 1901 now in force
attempted to bring order out of this confusion.”). Due to this confusion, the State legislature passed a
law in 1936 establishing a Board of Statutory Consolidation in order to consolidate “all the living law
of the city in a complete codification, and . . . to prepare an administrative code in harmony with the
provisions of the charter so that when the code is completed the charter and the code will contain all the
law relating to the city.” Id. at 5–6. The Board of Consolidation consisted of the “Mayor, the
Comptroller, the President of the Board of Aldermen and the Corporation Counsel.” Id. at 5. It is fair
to say that at the time of the adoption of the new City Charter, the laws and administrative code
underwent a complete overhaul.
165
Id. at 6.
166
Id.
167
See id. at 41–42 (noting that the Charter “should [now] be far less open to impairment by state
legislation”).
168
Id. The Commission acknowledged that the Home Rule Amendment strived to prevent
162
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hoped that “the new short-form charter . . . [would] be less subject to
[state] legislative interference and [would] stimulate the exercise of the
home rule power in the City of New York.”169 With the hope of achieving
this end, the new charter purposely only pertained to “matters directly
affecting the property, government and affairs of the city.”170
The State also acknowledged the need to enable New York City to deal
with its own matters: “[G]overnmental problems of the City of New York
are peculiar to it. Nowhere else in the state does one meet the same
conditions.”171 At the time, New York City was the largest city in the
world with a population of over seven million people, and it accounted for
over half the individuals living in the state.172 In addition, the City also had
to address the problems exacerbated by “a daily floating population of half
a million people.”173 In particular, the Committee acknowledged the
challenges to health and police services in the city.174
According to the Constitutional Convention Committee of 1938:
The New Charter was intended only to outline in skeleton
form the agencies of the city government and their basic
functions. It does not purport to embody all of the provisions
of law relating to the government of the city. It provides the
structural framework of the city government and is intended
to set forth the organic law relating to the city. It was
intended that the details of administration be included in an
administrative code. Such a code was to reenact all
provisions of law affecting the city which were consistent
with the provisions of the New Charter.
An analogy might be drawn in describing the relationship
between the administrative code and the charter as on a par
with the relationship between the statutory law and the
constitution of a sovereign body, wherein those provisions
which were intended to be flexible and to yield to changing
conditions would be subject to easy amendment, while
primary grants of powers and important limitations upon
abuses of power would be contained in a body of law which
would express fundamental principles and ideals of
government.175
“charter tinkering” on the part of the state legislature. Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 41.
171
N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT, supra note 159, at 2.
172
PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE, supra note 133, at 1–2.
173
N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT supra note 159, at 2.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added).
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The State Constitutional Convention Committee envisioned the city
administrative agencies serving a key role in promulgating regulations to
address the peculiar problems of governance in the city. The view of the
city charter as a skeletal form paralleled the New York City Revision
Commission’s object to create a short-form charter.176
According to the State Committee, under the charter, “the Board of
Health . . . appointed by the Mayor, has plenary powers in relation to the
enactment of Sanitary Code provisions. It may legislate with the force and
effect of law on any matter where the health and safety of the people are
concerned.”177 At the same time, the State Constitutional Commission
observed that, under the charter, the City Council “possesses the sole
legislative power of the City.”178 The City Charter Revision Commission
similarly noted that the City Council “is vested with the entire legislative
power of the city . . . and local laws may be initiated only in the Council,
which will alone constitute the local legislative body under the City Home
Rule Law.”179 However, the City Revision Commission also declared:
“The Board of Health exercises extraordinary police powers affecting the
health of the city. By its power to adopt a sanitary code the Board has
plenary powers of legislation.”180 The report further noted: “The important
legislative and semi-judicial powers of the Board of Health are recognized
by giving to it a greater degree of independence through the lengthening of
the terms of its members . . . and making them overlap and allowing
removal only on charges. . . . [Certain] members must be doctors of
medicine.”181
2. Provisions of Today’s Charter Empowering the Board of Health
Under New York State law, localities are allowed to enact and enforce
176
See supra text accompanying notes 165 and 169 (noting the charter revision committee’s intent
to create a short-form charter).
177
N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT, supra note 159, at 14. For
purposes of this Note, “Sanitary Code” and “Health Code” are synonymous. The Sanitary Code was
the predecessor to the modern Health Code. Paduano v. City of New York, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 218 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1966); see Metro. Ass’n of Private Day Sch., Inc. v.
Baumgartner, 245 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (“The attacked sections stem from a
complete revision of the former Sanitary Code, which the Board of Health found no longer kept pace
with a health and welfare philosophy capable of reflecting the changing times and modes of city living.
Accordingly, in order to properly fulfill its duties for the preservation of life, care and promotion of the
public health of the City of New York, the Board of Health found that there was a need to revise the
former Sanitary Code in existence since 1914 and bring into being a new health code. . . . After a
period of three and one-half years, the present New York City Health Code was drafted as an annotated
code with introductory notes, each section followed by the reviser’s notes containing the derivation of
the section and other pertinent references.”).
178
Id. at 7
179
N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 157, at 7.
180
Id. at 38 (emphases added).
181
Id. (emphasis added).
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their own health codes, with the one caveat that the regulations of the local
boards of health must at least comply with the minimum standards set forth
under the State Sanitary Code.182 Accordingly, “[i]n granting the localities
this power, the State has disclaimed any intention to preempt or supersede
local health codes and their enforcement mechanisms.”183 In addition,
New York City is specifically exempted from article three of the New
York Public Health Laws, which provides for the organization of local
boards of health.184
The charter establishes the Board of Health within the City’s
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.185 The Board of Health has
jurisdiction to add to, alter, and amend the health code pertaining to “all
matters and subjects to which the power and authority of the department
extends.”186 The New York City Health Code is codified in title twentyfour of the Rules of the City of New York,187 and maintains the force and
effect of law.188 The Board retains jurisdiction “to regulate all matters
affecting health in the City of New York and to perform all those functions
and operations performed by the city that relate to the health of the people
of the city.”189 The Board of Health is specifically charged with the power
to “supervise the reporting and control of communicable and chronic
diseases and conditions hazardous to life and health.”190 The charter does
not set forth an exhaustive list of matters over which the Board of Health’s
jurisdiction extends.191 However, the charter specifies that the Board is
empowered to “supervise and regulate the food and drug supply of the city
and other businesses and activities affecting public health in the city, and
ensure that such businesses and activities are conducted in a manner
consistent with the public interest.”192 The Board of Health may confer
182
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 228(3) (McKinney 2012) (“Local laws, ordinances or regulations
which comply with at least the minimum applicable standards set forth in the sanitary code shall be
deemed not inconsistent with such code.”).
183
People v. 230 W. 54th St. Corp., 516 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987).
184
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 312 (McKinney 2012) (“Unless otherwise expressly provided,
the provisions of this article except section three hundred ten of this chapter shall not apply to the city
of New York.”). Under section 310, “[t]he [state] commissioner may annul or modify an order,
regulation, by-law or ordinance of a local board of health concerning a matter which in his judgment
affects the public health beyond the territory over which such local board of health has jurisdiction.”
Id. § 310.
185
See supra Part III.A (providing a historical overview of the Board of Health)
186
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 558(c).
187
Declaration of Thomas R. Frieden at 1–2, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509
F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 1:08-cv-01000-RJH), [hereinafter Declaration of Frieden 2007].
188
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 558(a).
189
Id. § 556.
190
Id. § 556(c)(2) (emphasis added).
191
Id. § 556.
192
Id. § 556(c)(9); see Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 2 (“[O]versight of the
City’s restaurants is a historical and core public health function that the Department has performed for
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additional powers on the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene within
the limits of the state constitution and laws, as well as the city charter
itself.193 The amendments to the health code may be enforced by fine,
penalty, forfeitures, and imprisonment.194 In addition, the Board of Health
is given rulemaking authority under the charter, which sets out rulemaking
procedures that provide for an opportunity for public notice and an
opportunity for public comment.195
C. Case Law Interpreting the Powers of the Board of Health
The New York State Legislature’s authority to grant local governments
the ability to regulate local health affairs has long been upheld against
challenges asserting that such delegation violates the separation of powers
doctrine of the state constitution.196 The New York City Health Code is “a
body of administrative provisions sanctioned by a time-honored exception
to the principle that there is to be no transfer to the authority of the
Legislature.”197 This exception to the separation of powers doctrine
derives from the home rule provisions of the state constitution and the
Municipal Home Rule Law, which vests power in the cities over their own
affairs.198 Significantly, the New York Court of Appeals in Mooney v.
many decades. The State of New York has recognized this by designating me, as the Commissioner of
the Department, to be the permit-issuing official for food service establishments operating here.”).
193
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 558(b).
194
Id. A violation of the health code is treated as a misdemeanor. Id. § 558(e).
195
Id. § 1043(a), (b)(1), (e).
196
See People v. Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. 1942) (upholding the New York City Charter
granting the Board of Health the ability to establish the Health Code, against a challenge that the state
legislature, in granting the ability to establish such a charter, delegated to a local board legislative
power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine under article III, section 1 of the state
constitution); Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 107, 126 (N.Y. Com. Pl. 1866) (upholding the state
statute creating the New York Metropolitan Board of Health against a constitutional challenge that the
legislature was delegating away its legislative power, by acknowledging that the state legislature
“constantly exercises the powers of conferring upon local bodies created for public purposes, the
authority to make and to enforce by-laws or ordinances,” and specifically observing the tradition of
those empowered public bodies “to make rules and regulations for the protection of the public health,
which were enforced with the effect of law”); see also Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Separation of
Powers—Delegation of Legislative Powers to Boards of Health, 20 HARV. L. REV. 147, 147 (1906)
(“Except in the case of municipal corporations, the legislature cannot constitutionally delegate its
lawmaking power to agents. This rather vague rule has been liberally interpreted in favor of boards of
health. For example, a statute authorizing measures preventive of smallpox confers constitutional
authority upon a board to compel vaccination during an epidemic.” (citations omitted)).
197
Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d at 8.
198
See Mooney v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. 1936) (asserting that the home rule provisions
vest in localities “the power to adopt and amend local laws, not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the state, relating to many matters which are therein considered to be the property, affairs or
government of the city”); see also People v. 230 W. 54th St. Corp., 516 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1987) (“It has long been established that New York City has the police power to enact and enforce
laws such as Section 558(e) of the NYC Charter for the protection, safety, health and well-being of
persons and property within its control under Municipal Home Rule Law, Section 10(1)(ii)(a)(11) and

834

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:807

199

Cohen noted the freedom of municipalities to enact local laws, stating:
“No limitation is here found upon the method by which these local laws
shall be adopted, and no replica of the State Senate and Assembly is
necessary.”200
As the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, the “main business of
safeguarding the public health has always of necessity been done by local
boards.”201 The court has declared that:
The deduction is clear from section 558 of the City Charter—
which empowers the Board of Health to legislate in the field
of health generally . . . —that the [state] Legislature intended
the Board of Health to be the sole legislative authority within
the City of New York in the field of health regulations as
long as those regulations were not inconsistent with or
contrary to State laws dealing with the same subject
matter.202
Consequently, “[t]he power of the Board to enact provisions for the
furtherance and protection of health has long been established as a
constitutional exercise of power.”203 The Board of Health retains the
power to “act in [a] legislative capacity under State legislative
authority.”204 The police power granted to the Board from the state is
broad, “limited only by the requirement that there be a reasonable
relationship to the public health or welfare and that it not be exercised
arbitrarily.”205
In an illustrative case, Grossman v. Baumgartner,206 the regulation at
issue amended the health code to prohibit tattooing in New York City207
(4)(a), (b) and Article IX, Section 2(c) of the NYS Constitution.”).
199
4 N.E.2d 73.
200
4 N.E.2d at 74.
201
Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d at 8.
202
Grossman v. Baumgartner, 218 N.E.2d 259, 263 (N.Y. 1966); see Schulman v. N.Y.C. Health
& Hosp. Corp., 342 N.E.2d 501, 502 n.1 (N.Y. 1975) (citing to Grossman for the proposition that “the
Board of Health has been recognized by the Legislature as the sole legislative authority in the field of
health regulation in the City of New York”).
203
Paduano v. City of New York, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535–36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (concluding
that a fluoridation regulation of the Board of Health was directed toward the “security of the life and
health” of the residents of the City in order “to cope with the serious and growing public health
problem of tooth decay and dental neglect,” and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the Department
of Health), aff’d, 260 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 218 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1966).
204
Id. at 538.
205
Metro. Ass’n of Private Day Sch., Inc. v. Baumgartner, 245 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736–37 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1963).
206
218 N.E.2d 259.
207
The regulation allowed tattooing for a medical purpose and by a licensed physician or
osteopath. Grossman, 218 N.E.2d at 261. The Appellate Division inaccurately asserted that the
regulation at issue in Grossman only prohibited tattooing of a child under sixteen years old. N.Y.

2013]

THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE PORTION CAP RULE

835

because evidence established a connection between tattooing and serum
hepatitis.208 The plaintiffs, former owners of tattoo parlors, went out of
business due to the regulation.209 The opposition to the regulation asserted
an identical argument to the one made by the petitioners challenging the
portion cap rule, arguing that the tattoo regulation was an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.210 The New York Court of Appeals in Grossman quickly
disposed of this argument:
As this court wrote in the Blanchard case, “Within limits that
are to be measured by tradition, the State may commit to
local governments the power to regulate local affairs. . . . On
that basis, the main business of safeguarding the public
health has always of necessity been done by local boards or
officers through sanitary by-laws or ordinances which have
been accorded the force of law.”211
Despite the mandate of the separation of powers doctrine that the
“[l]egislature make the critical policy decisions, while the executive
branch’s responsibility is to implement those policies,” the New York
Court of Appeals “has always understood that the duties and powers of the
legislative and executive branches cannot be neatly divided into isolated
pockets.”212 Further, the court has “acknowledged that there need not be a
specific and detailed legislative expression authorizing a particular
executive act as long as ‘the basic policy decisions underlying the
regulations have been made and articulated by the Legislature.’”213 Due to
the inherent ambiguity of legislative inaction, failure on the part of the
legislature to enact a law pertaining to the subject matter of a regulation or
order by the executive branch is not inevitably indicative of legislative
disapproval.214 The court views the mandate of the separation of powers
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene,
110 A.D. 3d 1, 13–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
208
Grossman, 218 N.E.2d at 262 (“A review of the evidence given by defendants’ witnesses
thoroughly demonstrates the [regulation’s] compelling medical necessity . . . .”).
209
Id. at 261.
210
Id. at 262.
211
Id. at 262–63 (quoting People v. Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. 1942)).
212
Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995).
213
Id. (quoting N.Y. Health Facilities Ass’n, Inc. v. Axelrod, 569 N.E.2d 860, 863 (N.Y. 1991)).
Therefore, “[i]t is only when the Executive acts inconsistently with the Legislature, or usurps its
prerogatives, that the doctrine of separation is violated.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Clark v.
Cuomo, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1985)).
214
See id. at 175 (“[T]he Legislature considered but failed to enact a bill substantially similar to
the provisions of the Executive Orders ultimately issued by the Governor. . . . [T]he plaintiffs argued
that such failure should be taken as proof of hostile legislative intent. As we [have] said . . . however,
‘that proposed legislation similar to [the] Executive Order was not passed does not indicate legislative
disapproval of the programs contemplated by the order.’” (quoting Clark, 486 N.E.2d at 798)).
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doctrine from a commonsense perspective, demonstrating a “long-standing
and steadfast refusal to construe the . . . doctrine in a vacuum.”215 Out of
necessity, there will be overlap between the powers of the separate
branches of government.216
Under the city charter, the Board of Health is granted the discretionary
power to amend or repeal the health code in order to meet the demands of
changing public health needs.217 Recently, a regulation amending the
health code by establishing a list of wild animals prohibited from the city
was upheld against a challenge that the delegation of powers under the
New York City Charter violated the separation of powers doctrine.218 The
plaintiffs did not meet their burden in demonstrating that the delegation of
powers to the Board violated the separation of powers doctrine,
“particularly given the expertise of the Board of Health in areas of public
health and medicine.”219 The plaintiffs also did not demonstrate that in
promulgating the regulation, the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously or
contrary to law.220 The court acknowledged that the Board of Health
derived its power from sections 556 and 558 of the New York City
Charter, and under “the police powers of the Executive Branch to control
the harboring of animals, especially wild or dangerous animals.”221
1. Proper Judicial Review of a Board of Health Regulation
A health code amendment promulgated pursuant to the Board of
Health’s police power is afforded a presumption of constitutionality.222
After establishing the legality to enact the amendment, the review by a
court of law “is limited to whether . . . [the] determination is rationally
based, i.e., whether it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.”223 An
amendment of the health code will be upheld if there is “compelling
medical necessity” supporting the amendment or when it cannot be said
that the Board, given its expertise, promulgated an unreasonable
215

Id. at 173.
See id. (citing to the overlap between the branches of government in a case concerning an
Executive Order against a challenge that the Governor circumvented the state legislature).
217
See N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 607–08 (N.Y. 1991) (observing
that a similar Public Health Law granting the state Public Health Council (PHC) the discretion to
“establish, and from time to time, amend and repeal sanitary regulations, to be known as the sanitary
code of the state of New York,” reflects the flexibility granted to the PHC to adapt to conditions “in
order to deal with changing public health concerns”).
218
Glass v. City of New York, No. 121839/99, 2002 WL 1461895, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
14, 2002).
219
Id. at *2.
220
Id.
221
Id. at *1.
222
See Metro. Ass’n of Private Day Sch., Inc. v. Baumgartner, 245 N.Y.S.2d 733, 737 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1963) (“This presumption is of course rebuttable, but he who would rebut must show that there is
no permissible interpretation of all the facts which justify the imposition of such police powers.”).
223
N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 609 (N.Y. 1991) (emphasis added).
216
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regulation, devoid of justification.
The New York Court of Appeals has
declared that “[t]he police power [of the Board] is exceedingly broad, and
the courts will not substitute their judgment of a public health problem for
that of eminently qualified physicians in the field of public health.”225
D. The Board of Health’s Commitment to Combating Obesity
Increasingly, “[p]olicymakers, public health professionals, advocacy
groups, and researchers . . . recognize law as a valuable tool for the
prevention of chronic diseases and of obesity in particular.”226 This truth
has been demonstrated by the regulatory actions of the New York City
Board of Health, under former Commissioner Frieden and current
Commissioner Farley.
The Board of Health has responded to the childhood obesity epidemic
in a number of ways. In 2006, the Board adopted new requirements for the
nutritional value of food and beverages served in group day care facilities
licensed by the Department of Health.227 In January 2007, the Department
of Health implemented a rule promulgated by the Board of Health
“mandating that day care services provide at least sixty minutes of
specified types of daily physical activity.”228
In addition, in December 2005, the Board of Health amended the
health code to require the reporting of blood sugar (Hemoglobin A1C) test
results to the Department of Health in an attempt to curb diabetes.229 This
was followed by the year of trans-fat regulation.230 At the beginning of
224

Grossman v. Baumgartner, 218 N.E.2d 259, 262 (N.Y. 1966).
Id; see also N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons, 572 N.E.2d at 609 (“We cannot substitute our
judgment for that of qualified experts in the field of public health unless their judgment is ‘without
justification.’” (quoting Grossman, 218 N.E.2d at 262)).
226
Monroe et al., supra note 5.
227
Id. at 17. Under the regulation, “[b]everages with added sweeteners, whether artificial or
natural, shall not be provided to children.” 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61(b)(1) (2013).
228
24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61; Monroe et al., supra note 5, at 17. The rule also:
225

[P]roscribed television, video, and “other visual recordings” for children younger
than 2 years of age; restricted viewing to 60 minutes daily for older children; and
limited viewing to “educational programs or programs that actively engage child
movement.” Additional requirements were approved in September 2008 for outdoor
activity and play equipment.
Id. (quoting 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61).
229
Id. at 123–24. Dr. Frieden, the Health Department Commissioner “is enthusiastic about the
new program, hoping it will reduce the number of people in New York City with uncontrolled diabetes,
particularly Type 2 diabetes.” Id. at 121. The records must include the patient’s name, date of birth,
address, physician, and other information. Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing
Legal Boundaries, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121, 121 (2007).
230
“[A]lso referred to as trans fatty acid or partially hydrogenated oil, [trans-fat] is created by
adding hydrogen to vegetable oils, turning them into solid fats; trans-fat is used commercially primarily
to extend shelf life and add taste to cooked foods. This ‘bad’ fat contributes to heart disease and
obesity.” Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, It’s Not a Small World After All: Regulating Obesity Globally, 79
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2006, a federal regulation promulgated by the FDA required inclusion of
trans-fat content in the nutritional labels of packaged foods.231 Then, the
New York City Board of Health amended the health code in December
2006, mandating that artificial trans-fats be virtually removed from food
served in the City’s restaurants.232
Perhaps one of the most widely publicized initiatives of the Board of
Health concerned the posting of calories on menus and menu boards in
restaurants. In a lawsuit challenging the regulation, the Board of Health
stated that “calories are the single most important piece of nutritional
information related to weight gain.”233 As Department of Health
Commissioner Frieden explained, the Board promulgated the regulation
“because the Board and Department are charged with the prevention and
control not just of communicable diseases, but also of chronic diseases and
their risk factors. Calorie posting will allow New Yorkers to make the
healthy choices needed to prevent or manage chronic diseases associated
with obesity.”234 The regulation required all chain restaurants with fifteen
or more establishments nationwide to display calorie content.235 The New
York City menu labeling regulation set a trend for the nation,236 and the
federal government eventually followed suit. The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress in March 2010, promulgated a
national nutritional disclosure regulation, requiring food establishments
with twenty or more locations to disclose nutritional information regarding

MISS. L.J. 697, 699–700 (2010).
231
21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2006); Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 230, at 699.
232
Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 230, at 700. Specifically, under the regulation:
No foods containing artificial trans fat . . . shall be stored, distributed, held for
service, used in preparation of any menu item or served in any food service
establishment or by any mobile food unit commissary, as defined in § 89.01 of this
Code or successor provision, except food that is being served directly to patrons in a
manufacturer’s original sealed package.
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.08(a). “The Health Department followed the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
labeling regulations in permitting, however, service of foods that contain less than 0.5 grams of trans
fat per serving.” Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 230, at 700.
233
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
234
Declaration of Frieden 2007, supra note 187, at 5.
235
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.50(a)(1). The Board’s first attempt at a menu labeling regulation only
applied to those restaurants that voluntarily chose to make calorie content information available, and
the court found the regulation expressly preempted by the Nutrition Labeling Education Act. N.Y. State
Rest. Ass’n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 363. Not surprisingly, however, “[t]aking its cue from the district
court’s opinion, on January 22, 2008, the New York City Board of Health repealed and modified the
2006 regulation . . . .” N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir.
2009).
236
Liza M. Escapa Lima, From the Big Apple to Big Ben: An Insight into Menu Labeling, 18
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (2011). Following the regulation, “numerous menu labeling laws
[were] implemented across the country.” Id.
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standard menu items.
To continue the City’s proactive approach in addressing the obesity
epidemic and the chronic diseases associated with obesity, Mayor
Bloomberg charged Linda Gibbs, Deputy Mayor of Health and Human
Services, and Cas Holloway, Deputy Mayor of Operations, with
assembling a multi-agency obesity task force.238 Convening in January
2012, the task force was charged with recommending innovative and
aggressive solutions to the obesity epidemic.239 The task force concluded
that, second only to tobacco, obesity is a leading cause of preventable
death and kills 5800 New York City residents every year.240 The task force
found that fifty-eight percent of adults, or 3,437,000 individuals, were
overweight or obese.241 According to its findings, “[s]ugary drinks are the
leading items associated with excess intake of calories in adults” and such
drinks “are now ubiquitous, calorie dense, cheap, served in large portion
sizes and aggressively promoted” in the city.242 Likely due to the
“ubiquity” of the beverages, the task force found sugary drinks to be the
largest contributor to the average caloric intake increase of two hundred to
three hundred calories per day over the last thirty years.243
V. AMENDING THE HEALTH CODE TO ENACT THE PORTION CAP RULE
IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE BOARD’S POLICE POWER
In his opinion, Judge Tingling ruled that the portion cap rule violated
the separation of powers doctrine under Boreali and, further, was an
arbitrary and capricious regulation.244 The Appellate Division affirmed
that decision under the Boreali analysis without addressing whether the
237
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573–77
(2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 343(q) (2012)). Food establishments covered by the section
must post calories next to the menu item, and the recommended daily caloric intake must be posted on
the menu. Escapa Lima, supra note 236, at 10. On the issue of preemption, state and local
governments cannot impose nutrition labeling requirements on restaurants and vending machines
covered by the Act and accompanying rules that are not identical to federal requirements; but states and
localities can, however, impose requirements on restaurants and vending machines not covered by the
Act.
Questions and Answers on the New Nutrition Labeling Requirements, U.S.
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm248731.htm (last
updated Apr. 24, 2013); see also Escapa Lima, supra note 236, at 10 (“This federal law will preempt
any state law regarding menu labeling . . . . supersed[ing] any local ordinance or regulation.”).
238
CITY OF N.Y., REVERSING THE EPIDEMIC: THE NEW YORK CITY OBESITY TASK FORCE PLAN
PREVENT
AND
CONTROL
OBESITY
2
(2012),
available
at
TO
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/otf_report.pdf.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 4.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 5.
243
Id.
244
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
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245

rule was arbitrary and capricious.
Both courts arrived at erroneous
conclusions based on their misunderstanding of the Board of Health’s
police power and misapplied the Boreali standard. In addition, Judge
Tingling blatantly misapplied judicial review in his ruling that the portion
cap rule was arbitrary and capricious.
A. The Relationship Between the Board of Health and City Council
The power of the Board of Health is not merely grounded in
tradition;246 it is grounded in law. The state legislature conferred upon
localities the ability to legislate and regulate to address local affairs,
through municipal home rule.247 Under the current Municipal Home Rule
Law, localities may adopt a home rule charter to codify their organic
law.248 Municipalities derive this police power from the state,249 and as the
New York Court of Appeals has acknowledged, the Board of Health has
broad discretion in the exercise of its police power.250
Under the charter, New York City’s municipal structure provides for a
powerful Board of Health, charged with promulgating regulations to meet
the health demands of the city. The New York City Charter Revision
Committee intended to vest a broad police power in the Board of Health to
amend and alter the health code. The observations of the State Convention
Committee substantiate this intention.
Both committees, while
acknowledging that the charter vested in the City Council the sole
legislative power of the City, affirmed that the police power granted to the
Board of Health ranks as a quasi-legislative plenary power.251 In the
opinion of the state legislature, the power of the Board of Health neither
impinges upon nor usurps the power of the City Council.
Therefore, any argument that the Board of Health circumvented the
245
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 11–12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
246
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *7
(asserting that respondents relied on “the history of the New York Legislature’s grants of authority as
well as the history of the City Charters [as] creat[ing] a quasi legislative body uniquely charged with
enacting laws protecting the public health in New York City” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
247
See supra Part IV.A.
248
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
249
See supra notes 153–64 and accompanying text (discussing the derivation of the municipal
police power).
250
See N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 607–08 (N.Y. 1991) (observing
that a similar Public Health Law granting the state PHC the discretion to “establish, and from time to
time, amend and repeal sanitary regulations, to be known as the sanitary code of the state of New
York,” reflects the flexibility granted to the PHC to adapt to conditions “in order to deal with changing
public health concerns” (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra text accompanying note 217
(acknowledging the discretionary power of the Board of Health).
251
See supra Part IV.B.1 (acknowledging the parallel assertions of the state constitutional
convention committee and the city charter revision committee).
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City Council by enacting the portion cap rule is illogical. The Appellate
Division inaccurately claimed that the Board “derives its power to establish
rules and regulations directly and solely from . . . the City Council.”252
Both the City Council and Board of Health are vested with their respective
legislative powers by the state legislature. The intent of the state
legislature is controlling, and that intent was for the Board of Health to be
the authority in the field of health regulation in the City.253 The New York
Court of Appeals has noted that the powers of each body cannot be neatly
separated, hence overlap is inevitable.254
The fact that the city charter was adopted in response to the particular
needs of the city clarifies that the distribution of power between the City
Council and the Board of Health was deliberate.
As has been
acknowledged recently, “[a]s part of New York City’s regulatory authority
to protect the public health and safety, the City, through legislation enacted
by the City Council and rulemaking promulgated by City agencies, passes
laws and regulations to safeguard public health and safety in the City.”255
As far back as the state legislature’s creation of the Metropolitan Board of
Health, the Board ranked as a local body of experts in the area of public
health, insulated from the political process.256 The Board specifically
retains the authority to regulate the business and activities of food service
establishments in a way that promotes the public interest.257 The Board
does not regulate such establishments in the name of special interest. The
New York City Charter Committee particularly noted the independence
granted to the members of the Board.258 Given the political influence of
the food and beverage industry,259 it is unsurprising that the members of
the Board of Health—appointed by the mayor and intentionally insulated
from the political process—promulgated the portion cap rule rather than
the City Council. The Board of Health’s trend-setting calorie posting and
trans-fat regulations may similarly be characterized as enactments that
252
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
253
See supra Part IV.B.1.
254
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
255
Michelle Goldberg-Cahn, Federal Preemption of Public Health and Safety Rules, 18 CITY L.
73, 73 (2012).
256
See supra Part III.A (providing a historical overview of the powers of the Board of Health).
257
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
258
See supra Part IV.B.1.
259
See, e.g., Aviva Shen, FDA Stalls on Obamacare’s Calorie Labeling Rule to Accommodate
Special
Interests,
THINK
PROGRESS
(Mar.
13,
2013),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/03/13/1703541/fda-menu-labeling/?mobile=nc
(acknowledging
that three years after the federal menu labeling law was enacted by Congress under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, “the Food and Drug Administration is still deliberating on the
extremely thorny issue of how to accommodate various special interests in executing the law,” with
“[t]he latest delay concern[ing] clashing interests in the restaurant and grocery lobbies, which believe
they should be exempt from the labeling rules” (emphasis omitted)).
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bypassed the City Council. However, as one scholar noted, “[t]he real
difference between more restrictive trans-fat bans and less restrictive soda
regulations may be that trans-fat bans do not prompt industry-funded
opposition to the same degree that regulations of big soda do.”260
As the New York Court of Appeals noted in Grossman, the argument
that the Board of Health violated the separation of powers doctrine ignores
the explicit powers granted to it under the charter and delegated to it by the
state legislature. The Board is explicitly granted the power to regulate in
order to control chronic disease, which it has passionately done in response
to the obesity epidemic.261 The portion cap rule, like the calorie posting
regulation, represents the intersection of the Board’s powers to regulate
food service establishments and to control chronic disease. The Court of
Appeals has affirmed that it is the Board of Health’s business to regulate
such matters, derived from the power granted by the state and city
charters.262
B. Misplaced Reliance on Boreali v. Axelrod
At the time Boreali v. Axelrod was decided, the state legislature had
failed to ban smoking in all public places,263 so the state Public Health
Council (PHC) promulgated a regulation to fill the void.264 The Court of
Appeals held that the PHC usurped its power as a state administrative
agency, rendering the regulation at issue invalid.265 The court concluded
that the PHC violated the separation of powers doctrine under the state
constitution because the “line between administrative rule-making and
legislative policy-making . . . [was] transgressed.”266
The court relied on the presence of four “circumstances” to invalidate
the regulation. First, exceptions to the regulation were “based solely upon
economic and social concerns;” the exemption of bars, convention centers
and small restaurants from the regulation was not founded upon
considerations of public health.267 The Court declared that it is “a uniquely
legislative function,” to “[s]trik[e] the proper balance among health
260
Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age
of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 90 (2013).
261
See supra Part IV.D.
262
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
263
517 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (N.Y. 1987).
264
The regulation “prohibit[ed] smoking in a wide variety of indoor areas that are open to the
public, including schools, hospitals, auditoriums, food markets, stores, banks, taxicabs and limousines.”
Id. It also excluded certain establishments including restaurants with seating capacity fewer than fifty,
as well as motel and hotel rooms. Id.
265
Id. at 1351.
266
Id. at 1355. In other words, “the agency stretched [the enabling] statute beyond its
constitutionally valid reach when it used the statute as a basis for drafting a code embodying its own
assessment of what public policy ought to be.” Id. at 1353.
267
Id. at 1355.

2013]

THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE PORTION CAP RULE

843

268

concerns, cost and privacy interests.”
Second, the court considered the
fact that the PHC “wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive
set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance.”269 Third, the Court
determined that the particular circumstances in Boreali warranted
consideration of the fact that the legislature had repeatedly failed to enact
legislation, “unable to reach agreement on the goals and methods that
should govern in resolving a society-wide health problem.”270 Finally, the
court determined that “no special expertise or technical competence in the
field of health was involved in the development of the antismoking
regulations challenged.”271
The Boreali separation of powers framework should not dictate the
legality of the portion cap rule, which concerns the relationship between
the New York City Board of Health and the New York City Council. The
Boreali framework fails to account for this unique relationship; notably,
the New York Court of Appeals has not decided a case employing the
Boreali analysis to the Board of Health-City Council relationship. Due to
the power of the New York City Board of Health, and unlike the
relationship between the PHC and the state legislature, “[s]triking the
proper balance among health concerns, cost and privacy interests”272 is not
“a uniquely legislative function” reserved for the City Council. The Board
of Health retains plenary powers of legislation.273 The Board of Health is
an independent body of health care experts charged with addressing the
peculiar health needs of the city.274 The commentary available at the time
of the modern city charter’s adoption elucidates the relationship between
the Board of Health and City Council; the Board of Health maintains
quasi-legislative power to promulgate regulations under the health code,
while the City Council retains power as a legislative body. In addition, as
New York’s highest court has acknowledged, local health boards are
charged with safeguarding the public health.275 Applying the Boreali
framework to the local level is problematic and flawed; the analysis fails to
account for the specific role of local boards of health envisioned by the
state legislature and confirmed by the Court of Appeals. Judge Tingling
and the Appellate Division ignored the entire line of case law that confirms
the broad powers of the Board of Health. A thorough investigation of the
intent of the state legislature in empowering the Board of Health was
268

Id.
Id. at 1356.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 1355.
273
See supra Part IV.B.1.
274
See supra Part IV.B.1.
275
See supra notes 200, 211 and accompanying text (describing cases in which the court has
charged local health boards with regulating local affairs).
269
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notably absent from both opinions. Instead, the Tingling opinion went
through a superficial and lengthy history of the city charter, while the
Appellate Division endeavored to employ only the Boreali analysis.276
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the Boreali framework does apply
to the Board of Health and City Council, the four prong analysis would still
weigh in favor of the portion cap rule’s constitutionality. The portion cap
rule was promulgated in response to the obesity epidemic plaguing the
city.277 As the Board of Health recognized and a growing body of research
confirms, sugar-sweetened beverages are fueling the obesity epidemic.278
Therefore, under the first consideration, the portion cap rule was
promulgated in the name of health considerations. The “loopholes” of the
portion cap rule were not fueled by political considerations. For example,
the exclusion of alcoholic beverages from the rule resulted from state law
that preempts the regulation of alcoholic beverages by the Board of Health
or the City Council.279
Under the second consideration, the Board of Health maintains the
broad authority to regulate chronic illness. The fact that the portion cap
rule was allegedly enacted on a “clean slate” is irrelevant given the Board’s
broad plenary powers to legislate.
In addressing the third Boreali consideration, it must be noted that the
Board of Health has extraordinary power granted under state law. The
Board of Health has historically promulgated rules aiming to decrease the
incidence of obesity within the city, as illustrated by the menu labeling and
trans-fat regulations, which have withstood legal challenges.280 The
Boreali court explicitly noted that given the particular circumstances of the
case, consideration of the fact that the state legislature had not passed a
smoking ban in public places was proper. However, given the balance of
power between the Board of Health and the City Council, the failure of the
City Council to pass a law regulating sugar-sweetened beverages should
not be considered.
Under the fourth consideration, the Board of Health itself is composed
of health professionals. Research by health experts elucidates the
connection between sugar-sweetened beverage consumption and obesity.
The portion cap rule is, therefore, grounded in expertise.

276
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 7–16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *11–15.
277
See supra Part III.B.
278
See supra Part II.
279
Memorandum of Law for Respondents at 27–28 & n.27, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL
1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
280
See supra Part IV.D.
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C. The Regulation Is Not Arbitrary and Capricious
Although Judge Tingling acknowledged the regulation’s
reasonableness, he concluded that the “loopholes in [the] Rule effectively
defeat[ed] [its] stated purpose,” and therefore the regulation was “fraught
with arbitrary and capricious consequences.”281 Some of the regulation’s
alleged “loopholes” include the following: it does not apply to grocery
stores and 7-Elevens; it does not apply to one hundred percent fruit juices
and beverages that are at least fifty percent milk; and it does not limit selfservice refills.282 However, Judge Tingling’s conclusion that the regulation
is arbitrary and capricious resulted from an improper judicial review of the
portion cap rule.
The regulation’s main objective was to improve the health of residents
due to the obesity epidemic in the city and curb the incidence of chronic
conditions that have inevitably followed. As the Board of Health made
clear, the increased portions of sugary beverages and coinciding increase in
caloric intake, by both adults and children, have added to the obesity
epidemic.283 The link between sugar-sweetened beverages and obesity and
chronic illnesses is also supported by empirical research.284 The regulation
cannot reasonably be judged to have been enacted devoid of any
justification, considering the compelling medical necessity supporting its
promulgation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed that the
“compelling medical necessity” principle is the proper standard of review
for a Board of Health action.285 A court should not substitute its own
judgment for that of the Board of Health.
The regulation’s alleged “loopholes” are reasonable and do not render
the regulation arbitrary and capricious. The portion cap rule “reflects an
incremental approach to addressing the complex epidemic of obesity,
consistent with the [Board of Health’s] historic practice of tackling
complex health problems in a step-wise manner.”286 The fact that sugarsweetened beverages are devoid of nutritional value necessitated
promulgation of the portion cap rule.287 In contrast, one hundred percent
fruit juices and drinks made predominately with milk are not devoid of
281

N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20.
See id. (“It is arbitrary and capricious because it applies to some but not all food
establishments in the City, it excludes other beverages that have significantly higher concentrations of
sugar sweeteners and/or calories on suspect grounds, and the loopholes inherent in the Rule, including
but not limited to no limitations on re-fills, defeat and/or serve to gut the purpose of the Rule.”); supra
Part III.B (detailing the provisions of the regulation).
283
See supra Part III.B.
284
See supra Part II.A.
285
See supra notes 206, 224 and accompanying text (giving examples of cases in which the court
upheld laws based on a “compelling medical necessity”).
286
Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Local Boards of Health et al., supra note 13, at 7–8.
287
See supra Part III.B.
282
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nutritional value.
Also, grocery stores and 7-Elevens are simply not
regulated by the Board of Health, and they fall under the regulatory control
of the State.289 Consistent with the fact that the Board of Health has
limited jurisdiction, with regulatory power only over those food service
establishments subject to article 81 of the New York City Health Code, the
“initial rule is a modest one, to be built on incrementally once it has been
evaluated.”290
Self-service refills are not regulated, but neither is the practice of
consumers purchasing a sixteen ounce soda at one restaurant, then walking
down the street and purchasing a second sixteen ounce soda to get their
thirty-two ounce soda fix. Enforcement of a limit on refills or the number
of beverages one consumer can purchase at one time from multiple food
service establishments would be impossible and untenable. These
practices are thus outside the purview of the regulation. Although Judge
Tingling is within his rights to disagree with the particular terms of the
regulation, it is not the role of the judiciary to substitute its judgment for
that of a local board of health intentionally comprised of medical experts.
According to public health law experts, “[a]lthough the Portion Cap Rule
does not prevent all industry strategies that encourage people to consume
excessive quantities of high-calorie beverages, there is every reason to
anticipate that it will be effective in reducing consumption in the regulated
restaurants.”291
VI. THE LEGALITY OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH’S REGULATION
UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
In addition to the arguments grounded in state law, there are potential
legal challenges that may be asserted against the New York Board of
Health’s portion cap rule under the federal Constitution.292 Two of these
challenges are addressed below.

288

Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20.
Memorandum of Law for Respondents, supra note 279, at 27.
290
Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Local Boards of Health et al., supra note 13, at 11.
291
Id. at 8. Consequently, “[t]he Rule should be upheld as a crucial first step towards reducing
consumption of the high-calorie beverages that are a major contributor to obesity.” Id.
292
See Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Portion Sizes and Beyond—Government’s
Legal Authority to Regulate Food-Industry Practices, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383, 1384–85 (asserting
that “[g]overnments have the authority to act in this arena, and though industry may launch legal
challenges, there does not appear to be a sound basis for that opposition to prevail.”); see also NYC Ban
on Big Sodas Could Face Legal Test, CRAIN’S (June 14, 2012, 3:53 PM),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120614/RETAIL_APPAREL/120619933 (stating the belief
of a constitutional law professor at Pace University that the rule may violate the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution).
289
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A. Dormant Commerce Clause
Under the Commerce Clause, “[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit
Commerce Clause protection,”293 as Congress has the power to regulate
“[c]ommerce . . . among the several States.”294 The Commerce Clause,
“[t]hough phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress . . . has long
been understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of
articles of commerce.”295 The Dormant Commerce Clause applies with
equal force to municipalities.296 As a threshold matter, sugar-sweetened
beverages are properly characterized as articles of interstate commerce.
Under Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the first step of the
analysis is to determine whether the regulation at issue “regulates
evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or
discriminates against interstate commerce.”297 Discrimination manifests as
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, with
such treatment benefiting the in-state interests and working to the
detriment of the out-of-state interests.298 If the regulation is discriminatory,
If the regulation is
it is deemed “virtually per se invalid.”299
nondiscriminatory with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, the
regulation is valid unless the burden is in excess of the “putative local
benefits.”300
Here, the regulation is nondiscriminatory, as it actually works to the
detriment of in-state economic interests; if New Yorkers are willing to
purchase sugary beverages over sixteen ounces, such business would
arguably bolster the economic business of New York City restaurants and
other regulated proprietors. The regulation only affects businesses within
the borders of New York City and is “neutral [and] locally focused.”301 In
293

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
295
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
296
See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361
(1992) (“[O]ur prior cases teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the
strictures of the Commerce Clause . . . .”).
297
Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
298
Id.
299
Id.
300
Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
301
See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005)
(holding that Michigan’s one hundred dollar fee on trucking transactions within the state’s borders did
not offend the dormant Commerce Clause because it did not “facially discriminate against interstate or
out-of-state activities,” and applied “evenhandedly to all carries” in the state, and asserting “[n]othing
in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant
Commerce Clause”).
294
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addition, in contrast to cases where regulations have been struck down as
striving toward “a presumably legitimate goal . . . achieved by the
illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national economy,”302
New York City is not attempting to isolate itself from the national
economy.
Notably, the Supreme Court has declared that “incidental burdens on
interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to
safeguard the health and safety of its people.”303 The portion cap rule may
produce some incidental burdens on interstate commerce, as manufacturers
of sugar-sweetened beverages will not be able to sell their products that are
over sixteen ounces in the food service establishments subject to the
regulation. However, the local benefits of the regulation vastly outweigh
the incidental burden on interstate commerce. New York City is facing a
severe obesity epidemic that negatively affects the health of its residents.
According to the New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, fifty-eight percent of adult residents in New York City are either
overweight or obese.304 In passing the regulation, the Board of Health
relied on a study revealing that six thousand New Yorkers die annually
from the health consequences of obesity.305 Considering the alarming rates
of sugar-sweetened beverage consumption, in combination with the
established connection between sugary beverage consumption and obesity
and chronic health problems, the potential local benefits of the portion cap
rule to the obesity epidemic plaguing New York City are great.
In addition, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the tendency to treat
laws of local governments that are not discriminatory on their face with
more leniency when the locality legislates under its “vested . . .
responsibility [to] protect[] the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens.”306 The “dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for
federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local
It weighs heavily in favor of
government to undertake.”307
constitutionality that the New York City regulation was enacted pursuant
to the Board of Health’s legitimate police power.

302

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
Id. at 623–24.
304
Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.
305
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
306
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342
(2007). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law at issue against a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge and noted that the ordinance was enacted by the local government’s police power “in an
effort to address waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern of local government.” Id. at 347.
307
Id. at 343.
303
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B. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Under the Constitution, the ABA could argue that soda drinkers and
sugary beverage consumers at large are being denied Equal Protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.308 A more likely argument under the
Equal Protection Clause may be asserted in regard to the food service
establishments falling under the regulation, specifically small and
However, the Supreme Court has
minority-owned businesses.309
acknowledged:
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.
It simply keeps governmental decision makers from treating
differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. . . .
[T]his Court’s cases are clear that, unless a classification
warrants some form of heightened review because it
jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on
the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal
Protection Clause requires only that the classification
rationally further a legitimate state interest.310
Here, the regulation neither implicates a suspect classification311 nor
impinges upon a fundamental right. Therefore, a court need only conclude
that the portion cap rule bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest. As acknowledged by the Supreme Court:
Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of
social and economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
308
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
309
See Memorandum of Law for the N.Y. State Conference of the NAACP & the Hispanic
Federation as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Petitioners at 7–8, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL
1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013) (asserting that the Board did not consider “those who own and
operate the small businesses disproportionately affected by this Ban,” and that the regulation “[a]t its
worst . . . arbitrarily discriminates against citizens and small business owners in African-American and
Hispanic communities”); Jason Kessler, Groups: NYC Soda Ban Unfair to Small, Minority-Owned
Businesses, CNN (Jan. 25, 2013, 6:24 AM), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/25/groups-nycsoda-ban-unfair-to-small-minority-owned-businesses/ (“New York City’s attempt to keep people from
fattening up on sugary soft drinks, by banning some of them, would disproportionately hurt small,
minority-owned businesses, according to the NAACP and the Hispanic Federation.”).
310
Nordlinger v. Hahn 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
311
It is extremely unlikely and borderline absurd to attempt to argue that the food service
establishments subject to the regulation are a suspect class. It would be more absurd to suggest sugarsweetened beverage consumers are a suspect class under the U.S. Constitution.
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fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification.312
A court will uphold the validity of a regulation if it “appears that any
classification which the regulation may involve has a reasonable basis
within the knowledge and experience of the official body by which it was
promulgated.”313 The rational basis test is a deferential standard.314 Given
the “strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional . . . a
party contending otherwise bears [a] heavy burden.”315
There is no doubt that the New York City Board of Health has a
legitimate interest in decreasing the incidence of obesity among its
citizenry. A rational relationship exists between restricting the size of
sugar-sweetened beverages sold in the food service establishments
regulated by the Board and the goal of decreasing the incidence of obesity
in the city. Sugar-sweetened beverages rank as the largest contributor to
the recent increase in average caloric intake in the city,316 and the
connection between sugar-sweetened beverage consumption and obesity
can no longer be ignored. The fact that grocery stores and 7-Elevens are
not subject to the regulation does not weigh in favor of concluding that the
regulation is discriminatory or irrational.317 The Board of Health did not
have the jurisdictional power to regulate those businesses.318 In addition,
the Board did not act irrationally merely by addressing the obesity

312
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). In addition, “a legislative choice
is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.” Id. at 315.
313
Stracquadanio v. Dep’t of Health of N.Y., 32 N.E.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. 1941). The court in
Stracquadanio further stated that the court “may declare such a regulation invalid only in the event that
it is so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary.” Id.
314
See People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (N.Y. 2009) (“The rational basis test is not a
demanding one. We have repeatedly quoted the United States Supreme Court’s description of it as ‘a
paradigm of judicial restraint.’” (quoting Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. at 314)). The New York
Court of Appeals, with regard to a Board of Health regulation of milk, declared that:

If the regulation . . . challenged bears a reasonable relation to a bona fide purpose by
the Board of Health to safeguard the milk supply of the city of New York as an
incident to the protection and promotion of public health, then the promulgation of
the regulation was a valid exercise of the Board’s authority.
Stracquadanio, 32 N.E.2d at 808.
315
Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1154.
316
See supra text accompanying note 243.
317
See N.Y.C. Friends of Ferrets v. City of New York, 876 F. Supp. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y.) (“A law
will not fail to pass constitutional muster under equal protection analysis merely because it contains
classifications which are underinclusive . . . .”), aff’d, 71 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 1995).
318
See supra note 309 (noting that these businesses are regulated by the state).
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319

epidemic incrementally.

VII. CONCLUSION
The portion cap rule is a polarizing regulation. According to a poll
conducted by the New York Times prior to the passage of the regulation, six
out of ten New York City residents opposed the regulation, calling it a
“bad idea.”320 It has also been reported that “[m]embers of virtually every
major constituency, from Republican politicians to the Daily Show’s Jon
Stewart, have vociferously objected to the Mayor’s plan.”321 On the other
side of the debate, according to Linda Gibbs, the Deputy Mayor for Health
and Human Services, who oversees the City’s Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene:
People move less and eat more, portion sizes have grown and
sugary beverages—full of empty calories—have grown
exponentially and nearly 6,000 New Yorkers are now dying
each year of obesity-related illness. The question rightly
becomes not “how dare the government intervene,” but “how
dare the government fail to intervene?”322
The portion cap rule is a constitutionally valid and necessary
amendment to the health code to curb the obesity epidemic in New York
City. The Board of Health regulates food service establishments in the
public interest, not in the name of special interests. Despite the current and
potential legal challenges asserted against the portion cap rule, the measure
319
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[T]he reform may
take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting others.” (citation omitted)); Justiana v. Niagara Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 45 F. Supp. 2d 236,
242–43 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (pertaining to an Equal Protection challenge against a regulation of the
county Board of Health, the court asserted that “the Board does not act irrationally by addressing the
problems presented by ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] one step at a time—that is, by restricting
smoking in some public places rather than others”); see NYC Ban on Big Sodas Could Face Legal Test,
supra note 292 (indicating that, according to Rick Hills, a professor of law at New York University,
“[c]ourts . . . have repeatedly ruled that the government can try to eradicate societal ills one step at a
time”).
320
Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda Ban, Calling It an
Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A19. In addition, nearly
450,000 New Yorkers signed a petition opposing the ban, which was drafted by an advocacy group
formed immediately after the plan to restrict sugary beverages was announced. Lindsey Coblentz,
Shaking up the Soda Industry: Faced with a Ban on Large Sugary Beverages in New York City, the
Soda Industry Is Looking to Revamp Its Image with Both Consumers and Nutrition Advocates, FOOD
MANUFACTURING, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 50, 50.
321
Nathan Sadeghi-Nejad, NYC’s Soda Ban Is a Good Idea, but a Tax Would Be Better, FORBES
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/natesadeghi/2012/09/13/nycs-soda-ban-is-a-good-ideabut-a-tax-would-be-better/.
322
Donya Currie, States in Brief: New York City Bans Large Sugary Drinks, NATION’S HEALTH,
Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 11, 11.
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should be upheld as a legal exercise of the Board’s powers. The Board
amended the city’s health code pursuant to the broad police power granted
to it by the state legislature and city charter. The portion cap rule is an
assertion of power under the Board’s power to regulate chronic disease
affecting the city—a power that has been used and upheld before to combat
obesity. Increased portion sizes and the role of sugar-sweetened beverages
in increasing city residents’ caloric intake formed the foundation of the
Board’s reasoning for the measure. But above all, the link between sugarsweetened beverage consumption and obesity—which in turn increases the
risk of severe chronic conditions—motivated the promulgation of the
portion cap rule. The portion cap rule’s effectiveness and influence on
other governmental bodies facing the public health crisis of obesity
remains to be seen.

